The Executive in the Constitution
Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control
Published on 26. August 1999
Book
Hardback
441 pages
978-0-19-826870-3 (ISBN)
Description
The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control is the first constitutional and legal analysis of the inner workings of the executive for many years. It aims to provoke a reappraisal, by constitutional lawyers, of the place of the executive within the constitution, by exploring an area hitherto largely neglected in constitutional law: the legal foundations of the powers and structure of the executive, and the mechanisms through which the centre of the executive seeks to control the actions of departments.
The authors, both pre-eminent in the field off constitutional law, show that the machinery of executive co-ordination and control is no less crucial a dimension of the constitutional order than the external machinery of democratic and legal control. These external parliamentary and judicial controls depend for their effectiveness on the executive's ability to control itself. The plural structure of the executive, however, makes the co-ordination and control of its component parts a highly problematical pursuit. Against the background of an analysis of the executive's legal structure, the book examines in detail the controls governing departmental access to staffing, financial, and legal resources, analysing the relationship between these internal controls and the external machinery of democratic and legal control, and showing how the machinery of internal control has been shaped by the structure of the executive branch.
The organization of the executive and the way it controls the actions of its departments has changed significantly in recent year. This book explores the impact of the machinery if executive co-ordination and control of the ambitious public service reform project which has been pursued by successive governments over the last twenty years, as well as of changes in the wider constitutional framework, including those stemming from the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union and the growth of judicial review. It shows how public service reforms, judicial review, and European law are changing not just the inner life of the executive government but its place in the constitution as well.
The authors, both pre-eminent in the field off constitutional law, show that the machinery of executive co-ordination and control is no less crucial a dimension of the constitutional order than the external machinery of democratic and legal control. These external parliamentary and judicial controls depend for their effectiveness on the executive's ability to control itself. The plural structure of the executive, however, makes the co-ordination and control of its component parts a highly problematical pursuit. Against the background of an analysis of the executive's legal structure, the book examines in detail the controls governing departmental access to staffing, financial, and legal resources, analysing the relationship between these internal controls and the external machinery of democratic and legal control, and showing how the machinery of internal control has been shaped by the structure of the executive branch.
The organization of the executive and the way it controls the actions of its departments has changed significantly in recent year. This book explores the impact of the machinery if executive co-ordination and control of the ambitious public service reform project which has been pursued by successive governments over the last twenty years, as well as of changes in the wider constitutional framework, including those stemming from the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union and the growth of judicial review. It shows how public service reforms, judicial review, and European law are changing not just the inner life of the executive government but its place in the constitution as well.
Reviews / Votes
this is a formidable addition to the literature of modern UK government and public administration, written from an unusual and innovative constitutional-legal perspective ... particuarly impressive in its skilful intermixing of historical analysis of traditional principles and a wide-ranging review of the implications of post-1979 public management reforms ... an extraordinary wealth of detail ... a useful and truly impressive book. * Gavin Drewry, New Institutionalism and Organizational Theory, a Review Article. * Daintith and Page have presented us with a masterly and illuminating account of the various and significant ways in which the executive plays its part in the working of the constitution and in maintaining and implementing basic constitutional principles. Their book enriches our understanding of the modern constitution and of the place within it of an executive whose role should not any longer be undervalued. * Colin Turpin The Cambridge Law Journal July 2000 Vol.59 Part 2 * This book will provide a useful reference for those who want to understand the formal mechanism for control on the fragmented Executive. * Martin J Smith, Govt and Opp. * a formidable addition to the literature of modern UK government and public administration ... the book contains an extraordinary wealth of detail ... a useful and truly impressive book. * Gavin Drewry, Public Administration Vol 78 Issue 2 * A wonderful description of current structures, processes, practices and rules which relate to the resources of the executive, its people, money and laws. * Brian Thompson, Parliamentary Affairs Vol.53 No.2 *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
bibliography
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 30 mm
Weight
863 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-826870-3 (9780198268703)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Terence Daintith is Professor of Law at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, at the University of London
Alan Page is Professor of Public Law at the University of London
Alan Page is Professor of Public Law at the University of London
Content
1. The executive in the constitution ; I Introduction ; II Why is the executive important? ; III Why is the executive neglected? ; IV Positive constitutional theory ; V The executive in a resource-based theory of the constitution ; 2. The executive in constitutional law ; I Introduction ; II The Crown ; III The ministerial department ; IV Hollowing out the department ; V The cabinet and ministry ; VI Conclusion ; 3. The civil service ; I Introduction ; II The legal basis of control ; III The organisation of control ; IV Recruitment ; V Conduct and discipline ; VI Conclusions ; 4. The financial resources of the government: institutions ; I Introduction: the constitutional dimension ; II The constitutional structure ; III The institutions of the executive ; 5. The financial resources of government: allocation and appropriation ; I Introduction: a plurality of systems ; II The Public Expenditure Survey system ; III The Supply system ; IV Resource accounting and budgeting ; 6. The financial resources of government: monitoring and control ; I In general: criteria, constraints, concepts ; II Treasury authorisations and delegations ; III Cash control ; IV Control and sanctions ; 7. The organisation of the legal function in government ; I Introduction ; II The development of the structure for government legal work ; III The current structure of legal services ; IV The Law Officers: history and status ; 8. Legislation ; I Introduction ; II Machinery and purposes ; III The impact of Europe ; IV Burdens on Business ; V Conclusions ; 9. Litigation and legal advice: co-ordination and control ; I The Law Officers, criminal prosecutions, and civil litigation ; II The Law Officers as the governments chief legal advisers ; III Cabinet Office co-ordination in legal matters ; IV Co-ordination within the framework of the Government Legal Service ; 10. Executive legality: constitutional background and current issues ; I Legality: pluralism and centralisation ; II Constitutional roots of our present system ; III The changing context ; IV Change within the executive ; 11. Better government: charter standards, open government and good administration ; I Introduction ; II The Citizens Charter and Service First ; III Access to official information ; IV External controls on standards of administration ; V Conclusion ; 12. Conclusions: internal control in a plural executive ; I Introduction ; II Trends in internal control ; III Internal control and external controls ; IV The constitutional significance of internal control ; Bibliography