Regulation Under Increasing Competition
Published on 11. October 2012
Book
Paperback/Softback
XII, 182 pages
978-1-4613-7328-5 (ISBN)
Description
Regulation Under Increasing Competition
brings together practitioners, regulators, and economists to examine the important policy and regulatory issues facing the telecommunications and electricity industries. This volume reviews such topics as competitive entry, stranded costs, pricing and market mechanisms. It provides a unique perspective on problems in a newly deregulated environment.
More details
Series
Edition
Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1999
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Illustrations
XII, 182 p.
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 12 mm
Weight
312 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4613-7328-5 (9781461373285)
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Michael A. Crew
Regulation Under Increasing Competition
E-Book
12/2012
Springer
€96.29
Available for download
Michael A. Crew
Regulation Under Increasing Competition
Book
11/1998
Kluwer Academic Publishers
€106.99
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
1 Regulatory Governance and Competitive Entry.- 2 Monopoly Leveraging, Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into InterLATA Toll.- 3 Lowering Prices with Tougher Regulation: Forward-Looking Costs, Depreciation, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.- 4 Stranded Assets in Network Industries in Transition.- 5 Comparing "Stranded Cost" Arguments in Telecommunications and Electricity.- 6 An Economic Analysis of the Stranded Cost Issue Facing Electric Utilities and Policymakers Today.- 7 Performance Measurement for Price-Cap Regulation of Telecommunications Using Evidence from a Cross-section Study of United States Local Exchange Carriers.- 8 Computable General Equilibrium Models and Electricity CO2 Emissions.- 9 Customer Response to Real-Time Prices in the England and Wales Electricity Market: Implications for Demand-Side Bidding and Pricing Options Design Under Competition.