The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2
Published on 7. February 2019
Book
Hardback
1016 pages
978-0-19-046977-1 (ISBN)
Description
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.
Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues.
Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues.
Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 250 mm
Width: 175 mm
Thickness: 58 mm
Weight
1897 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-046977-1 (9780190469771)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Roger D. Congleton | Bernard N. Grofman | Stefan Voigt
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2
E-Book
12/2018
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€148.99
Available for download
Roger D. Congleton | Bernard N. Grofman | Stefan Voigt
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2
E-Book
12/2018
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€148.99
Available for download
Persons
Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books.
Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.
Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.
Stefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy.
Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.
Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.
Stefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy.
Editor
BB&T Professor of Economics, West Virginia University and Adjunct Scholar, Center for the Study of Public ChoiceBB&T Professor of Economics, West Virginia University and Adjunct Scholar, Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University
Jack W. Peltason (Bren Foundation) Endowed Chair and Professor of Political Science and Social PsychologyJack W. Peltason (Bren Foundation) Endowed Chair and Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine
Professor and Director, Institute of Law and EconomicsProfessor and Director, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Content
PART V: Constitutional Political Economy
A. On the Architecture of Governance
1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted?
Nicolaus Tideman
2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected?
Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer
3. Divided Government: the king and the council
George Tridimas
4. Bicameralism
Cecilia Testa
5. Federalism
Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
Nicholas R. Miller
7. Politics and the Legal System
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal
8. Constitutional Review
Nuno Garoupa
9. Institutions for Amending Constitutions
Cristina Bucur and Bjorn Erik Rasch
10. Constitutional Transition
Zachary Elkins
11. Electoral systems in the making
Daniel Bochsler
12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
B?la Plechanovova, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov
B. The Theory of Dictatorship
13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
Martin C. McGuire
14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 Years
Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
15. Are There Types of Dictatorship?
Ronald Wintrobe
16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance
Alejandro Quiroz Flores
17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes
Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon
18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
Timur Kuran and Diego Romero
C. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance
19. Direct Democracy and Public Policy
John G. Matsusaka
20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems
Sebastian M. Saiegh
21. The Significance of Political Parties
Michael Munger
22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance
Georg Vanberg
23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann
PART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. The Politics of Public Policy
24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
Stanley L. Winer
25. The politics of central bank independence
Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
26. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung
27. Political Participation and the welfare
Rainald Borck
28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox
29. Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
Ilya Somin
30. Is Government Growth Inevitable?
Randall G. Holcombe
B. International Public Choice
31. The Political Economy of International Organizations
Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang
32. The Politics of International Trade
Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman
33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know?
Friedrich Schneider
34. The Politics of International Aid
Hristos Doucouliagos
35. Is democracy exportable?
Pierre Salmon
C. Public Choice and History
36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen
37. Christian History and Public Choice
Mario Ferrero
38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Keith L. Dougherty
39. Precursors to public choice
Iain McLean
D. Measurement and other Methodological Issues
40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole
41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
Keith T. Poole
42. Voting and Popularity
Gebhard Kirchgaessner
43. Detection of election fraud
Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack
44. Experimental Public Choice: Elections
Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram
45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner
A. On the Architecture of Governance
1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted?
Nicolaus Tideman
2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected?
Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer
3. Divided Government: the king and the council
George Tridimas
4. Bicameralism
Cecilia Testa
5. Federalism
Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
Nicholas R. Miller
7. Politics and the Legal System
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal
8. Constitutional Review
Nuno Garoupa
9. Institutions for Amending Constitutions
Cristina Bucur and Bjorn Erik Rasch
10. Constitutional Transition
Zachary Elkins
11. Electoral systems in the making
Daniel Bochsler
12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
B?la Plechanovova, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov
B. The Theory of Dictatorship
13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
Martin C. McGuire
14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 Years
Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
15. Are There Types of Dictatorship?
Ronald Wintrobe
16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance
Alejandro Quiroz Flores
17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes
Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon
18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
Timur Kuran and Diego Romero
C. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance
19. Direct Democracy and Public Policy
John G. Matsusaka
20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems
Sebastian M. Saiegh
21. The Significance of Political Parties
Michael Munger
22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance
Georg Vanberg
23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann
PART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. The Politics of Public Policy
24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
Stanley L. Winer
25. The politics of central bank independence
Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
26. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung
27. Political Participation and the welfare
Rainald Borck
28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox
29. Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
Ilya Somin
30. Is Government Growth Inevitable?
Randall G. Holcombe
B. International Public Choice
31. The Political Economy of International Organizations
Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang
32. The Politics of International Trade
Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman
33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know?
Friedrich Schneider
34. The Politics of International Aid
Hristos Doucouliagos
35. Is democracy exportable?
Pierre Salmon
C. Public Choice and History
36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen
37. Christian History and Public Choice
Mario Ferrero
38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Keith L. Dougherty
39. Precursors to public choice
Iain McLean
D. Measurement and other Methodological Issues
40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole
41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
Keith T. Poole
42. Voting and Popularity
Gebhard Kirchgaessner
43. Detection of election fraud
Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack
44. Experimental Public Choice: Elections
Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram
45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner