This book explores the idea that self-knowledge
comes in many varieties. We "know ourselves" through many different methods,
depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions,
sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call "self-knowledge" is
not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic
authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual
necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts.
This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the
epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as
inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as
transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as
expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative
"pluralist" position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the
phenomenon and its resistance to any "monistic" treatment, to pose new and
intriguing philosophical challenges.
Series
Edition
Language
Place of publication
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Dimensions
Height: 216 mm
Width: 153 mm
Thickness: 21 mm
Weight
ISBN-13
978-1-137-32612-6 (9781137326126)
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3
Schweitzer Classification
Annalisa Coliva (PhD University of St Andrews, UK and Vercelli, Italy)
is Full Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of California
at Irvine. She was previously Fulbright Fellow at Columbia University, US,
Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at Heidelberg University, Germany, and Fellow of
the Italian Academy at Columbia University. She has authored nine books, edited
six, and published several articles in international journals.
Acknowledgments.- Credits.- List of abbreviations.-
Introduction.- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States.- 1. Sensations and
perceptions.- The objectivity of perceptual representation.- Perceptual
contents.- Sensory states and sensations.- 2. Two
kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments.- Propositional
attitudes as dispositions.- Propositional
attitudes as commitments.- 3. Emotions.- Emotions as sensations.- Emotions as
evaluative judgments.- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes.- Emotions as
perceptions of evaluative properties.- The borderline view of emotions.- 4. Summary.- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge.-
1. First personal self-knowledge.- Groundlessness.- Transparency.- Authority.- 2.
Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? .- 3. Third-personal
self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts.- 1.
Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan.- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and
Cassam.- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon.- 4. Summary.- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts.-
1. Peacocke's rational internalism.- 2. Burge's rational externalism.- 3. Evans' transparency method.- 3.1
Fernández' epistemic account.- 3.2 Moran's deliberative account.- 4. Summary.-
Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. At the origins of expressivism:
Wittgenstein.- 2. Bar-On's neo-expressivism.- 3. Summary.- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories.- 1. The
left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker.- 2. The right-to-left
side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright.- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive
Thesis: Bilgrami.- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva.- The
first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency.- Objections from empirical
psychology.- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority.- 5. Summary.-
Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. Propositional attitudes as
commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts.- 2. Sensations, basic
emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets
expressivism.- Sensations.- Basic emotions.- Perceptions and perceptual
experiences.- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions:
third-personal self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Appendix: Moore's Paradox.- 1. Moorean
and Wittgensteinian analyses.- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of
Moore's paradox.- 3. What Moore's paradox isn't about: Jane's off case.- 4. What
Moore's paradox is about-first pass.- 5. What Moore's paradox is about-second
pass.- 6. An objection.- Notes.- Bibliography.- Name index.- Subject index.
