Game Theory in Economics and Management
Description
This volume is a collection of scholarly essays in game theory, economics, and management science published in honor of Guiomar Martín-Herrán, whose work has made significant contributions to dynamic optimization and the analysis of strategic interaction in economic and managerial contexts.
Its twelve chapters address a range of topics, including groundwater exploitation, pollution control, nonrenewable resources, dual-channel competition, environmental regulation, differential games, resource extraction, fisheries, common-pool resource management, climate change, and retail services, with a shared emphasis on equilibrium analysis and dynamic decision-making.
The book will be of interest to researchers, advanced graduate students, and specialists in economics, management science, operations research, and applied mathematics concerned with contemporary applications of game-theoretic and optimization methods.
More details
Persons
Francisco Cabo is a professor and the coordinator of Ph.Ds in economics at IMUVa, Universidad de Valladolid, Spain.
Salma Karray is a professor at the Faculty of Business & IT at Ontario Tech University, Canada.
Simon Pierre Sigué is the interim dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Athabasca University, Canada, and a visiting professor of marketing at the Wits Business School of Sciences, South Africa.
Content
Chapter 1. Conjectural learning in a groundwater exploitation problem.- Chapter 2. Stability of one- and two-agreement scenarios in pollution control problems.- Chapter 3. On cross-ownership in a nonrenewable resource differentiated product oligopoly.- Chapter 4. Strategic choice of sales models under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in a dual channel with service spillover effects.- Chapter 5. Taxes vs. standards with environmentally aware consumers: Monopolistic competition under free entry.- Chapter 6. Spectral based value and policy iteration methods in differential game problems.- Chapter 7. Hyperbolic PDEs and explicit solutions for Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium in resource extraction games.- Chapter 8. Sustainable dual-channel competition: Strategic implications of service-driven environmental externalities.- Chapter 9. A great fish war model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and asymmetric players.- Chapter 10. Formal and informal enforcement in common-pool resource management: A social network approach.- Chapter 11. Non-smooth climate change and emergent Nash equilibria in multi-regions hybrid differential game.- Chapter 12. Counterfeit competition and the value of retail service in distribution channels.