Learning In U.s. And Soviet Foreign Policy

Foreword -- Preface -- Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation -- Perspectives on Learning -- Introduction -- Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept -- Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations -- Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy -- Case Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy -- The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Arms Control -- Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe -- The Strategic Basic of Learning in U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949-1988 -- Learning in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Middle East -- The Lessons of Korea and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 -- Learning in U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Nixon-Kissinger Structure of Peace -- Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s -- Case Studies of Soviet Foreign Policy -- Learning in the Nuclear Age: Soviet Strategic Arms Control Policy, 1969-1989 -- Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe Since World War II -- Soviet Policy Toward China, 1969-1988 -- Learning in Soviet Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict -- Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev Meet the "Reagan Doctrine" -- Attempted Learning: Soviet Policy Toward the United States in the Brezhnev Era -- Soviet Learning in the 1980s -- Conclusions -- Learning and the Evolution of Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities -- Interactive Learning in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control -- What Have We Learned About Learning?