
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
Cambridge University Press
Published on 25. April 2016
Book
Hardback
548 pages
978-1-107-06043-2 (ISBN)
Description
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
Reviews / Votes
'The book offers to noneconomists an outstanding self-contained introduction to normative themes in contemporary economics and to economists a thorough discussion of the computational limits of their art. But I also recommend it to anyone with a taste for axiomatics: it is replete with new and open questions that will be with us for some time.' Herve Moulin, from the Foreword '... anyone who knows a fair amount about the field will find much enjoyable reading in any given chapter. Those who wish to know more should first read the compact but well-organized overview of many of the classical questions in Chapter 2, and then skip to a self-contained chapter of one's choice. Bribery? The internet? Cake cutting? It's all there, waiting for discovery.' Karl-Dieter Crisman, MAA Reviews 'Since the ?eld of computational social choice is growing rapidly, a handbook such as this at this juncture is the need of the hour. The handbook is the product of the efforts of 36 outstanding members of the computational social choice community. It provides elaborate initiations to the major areas of the ?eld. The handbook has already become an authoritative reference work and has been cited over 100 times since its publication. It contains many interesting open questions which will serve as fodder for hungry researchers ... The book is a treasure trove of ideas from economics and computer science. Academicians, professionals, researchers, and students in many disciplines including economics, computer science, game theory, mathematics, philosophy, and political science will gain from this approachable and self-contained handbook.' S. V. Nagaraj, SIGACT News 'As a final comment, let me say that this Handbook is a most remarkable volume. I was unable to detect defects or weaknesses. All chapters are well written, with an obvious objective regarding readership. Introduction sections are clear. The authors are capable of transmitting their knowledge, whatever the difficulty. I can only repeat myself by saying that it is highly recommended to all social scientists and all computer scientists interested in voting and in social choice in general.' Maurice Salles, OEconomia 'If readers are looking for a short and concise introduction to (computational) social choice and for in-depth descriptions of essential theoretical problems and computational solutions covering a wide range of topics (voting, allocation, etc.), then this handbook may really be useful.' Roman Seidl, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social SimulationMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
9 Tables, black and white; 41 Line drawings, unspecified
Dimensions
Height: 260 mm
Width: 183 mm
Thickness: 34 mm
Weight
1221 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-107-06043-2 (9781107060432)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Felix Brandt
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
E-Book
04/2016
Cambridge University Press
€45.49
Available for download

Felix Brandt | Vincent Conitzer | Ulle Endriss
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
E-Book
04/2016
Cambridge University Press
€53.49
Available for download
Persons
Felix Brandt is Professor of Computer Science and Professor of Mathematics at Technische Universitaet Muenchen. Vincent Conitzer is the Kimberly J. Jenkins University Professor of New Technologies and Professor of Computer Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. Ulle Endriss is Associate Professor of Logic and Artificial Intelligence at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam. Jerome Lang is a senior researcher in computer science at CNRS-LAMSADE, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Ariel D. Procaccia is Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University.
Editor
Technische Universitaet Muenchen
Duke University, North Carolina
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Universite de Paris IX (Paris-Dauphine)
Carnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania
Foreword
Content
Foreword Herve Moulin; 1. Introduction to computational social choice Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang and Ariel D. Procaccia; Part I. Voting: 2. Introduction to the theory of voting William S. Zwicker; 3. Tournament solutions Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein; 4. Weighted tournament solutions Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry and Rolf Niedermeier; 5. Dodgson's rule and Young's rule Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra; 6. Barriers to manipulation in voting Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh; 7. Control and bribery in voting Piotr Faliszewski and Joerg Rothe; 8. Rationalizations of voting rules Edith Elkind and Arkadii Slinko; 9. Voting in combinatorial domains Jerome Lang and Lirong Xia; 10. Incomplete information and communication in voting Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein; Part II. Fair Allocation: 11. Introduction to the theory of fair allocation William Thomson; 12. Fair allocation of indivisible goods Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet; 13. Cake cutting algorithms Ariel D. Procaccia; Part III. Coalition Formation: 14. Matching under preferences Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove and Francesca Rossi; 15. Hedonic games Haris Aziz and Rahul Savani; 16. Weighted voting games Georgios Chalkiadakis and Michael Wooldridge; Part IV. Additional Topics: 17. Judgment aggregation Ulle Endriss; 18. The axiomatic approach and the internet Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar; 19. Knockout tournaments Virginia Vassilevska-Williams.