The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets
Published on 10. August 2008
Book
Hardback
344 pages
978-0-691-12449-0 (ISBN)
Description
Most labor economics textbooks pay little attention to actual labor markets, with the exception of the occasional reference to competitive labor markets like that of the United States. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets" is the only textbook to focus on imperfectly competitive labor markets and to provide a systematic framework for analyzing how labor institutions function and interact in these markets. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets" examines the many institutions that affect the behavior of workers and employers in imperfect labor markets. These include minimum wages, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, working time regulations, family policies, collective bargaining, early retirement programs, and education and migration policies.Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are today being changed by political and economic forces. It provides a unique focus on institutions in imperfect labor markets.
It offers an integrated framework and systematic coverage. It includes a self-contained chapter on each of the most important labor market institutions. It contains end-of-chapter review questions.
It offers an integrated framework and systematic coverage. It includes a self-contained chapter on each of the most important labor market institutions. It contains end-of-chapter review questions.
Reviews / Votes
Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are today being changed by political and economic forces. -- "Abstracts of Public Administration, Development, and Environment The authors have written a very useful book aimed at providing a theoretical explanation and empirical reviews of evidence about a number of important issues in labor economics... Many of the topics covered here are relevant to public policy, law, and economics, or even international economics classes. Because the chapters are more or less self-contained, it would be easy to assign one or two as part of a broader course in human resources or personnel economics. And doing so would be a good thing. -- Peter Cappelli, Journal of Economic LiteratureMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
New Jersey
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Trade binding
Illustrations
61 line illus. 26 tables.
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Weight
624 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-691-12449-0 (9780691124490)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
New editions
Book
09/2013
2nd Edition
Princeton University Press
€71.92
Article exhausted; check different version
Additional editions
Tito Boeri | Jan Van Ours
The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets
Book
08/2008
Princeton University Press
€60.76
Article exhausted; check different version
Persons
Tito Boeri is professor of economics at Bocconi University in Milan and scientific director of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti. Jan van Ours is professor of labor economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands and professorial fellow in economics at the University of Melbourne.
Content
Preface xi Symbols and Acronyms xvii Chapter 1: Overview 1 1.1 A Few Key Definitions 2 1.2 A Competitive Labor Market 4 1.2.1 Labor Supply and the ReservationWage without Hours Restrictions 4 1.2.2 Aggregate Labor Supply 7 1.2.3 Labor Demand andWage Determination 9 1.2.4 Equilibrium 11 1.3 Labor Market Institutions 14 1.3.1 Acting on Prices 14 1.3.2 Acting on Quantities 15 1.3.3 Institutional Interactions 17 1.3.4 Why Do Labor Market Institutions Exist? 18 1.3.5 Product Market Competition and Institutional Reforms 21 1.4 Technical Annex: A Simple Static Framework 24 1.4.1 A Competitive Labor Market 24 1.4.2 Labor Market Institutions 25 1.4.3 TheWedge 26 1.4.4 Product Market Competition and the Employment Bias of Institutions 27 Chapter 2: MinimumWages 29 2.1 Cross-Country Comparisons 30 2.2 Theory 33 2.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 33 2.2.2 A Noncompetitive Labor Market 34 2.3 Empirical Evidence 38 2.3.1 Studies Based on Firm-Level Data 38 2.3.2 Studies Based on Natural Experiments 39 2.3.3 Studies Based onWorkers? Histories 43 2.4 Policy Issues 44 2.4.1 Should the MinimumWage Be Reduced or Increased? 44 2.4.2 Is the MinimumWage Effective in Reducing Earnings Inequality and Poverty? 45 2.5 Why Does a MinimumWage Exist? 46 2.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 47 2.7 Review Questions 47 2.8 Technical Annex: Fine-Tuning of the MinimumWage 48 Chapter 3: Unions and Collective Bargaining 51 3.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 52 3.1.1 Union Density 52 3.1.2 Coverage and Excess Coverage 54 3.1.3 Coordination 56 3.2 Theory 56 3.2.1 Collective Bargaining 57 3.2.2 Endogenous Membership 61 3.3 Empirical Evidence 66 3.3.1 Effects of Unions onWages 67 3.3.2 Bargaining Coordination, Union Density, and Unemployment 71 3.4 Policy Issues 72 3.4.1 Do Unions Increase Efficiency? 72 3.4.2 Should Collective Bargaining Be Decentralized? 74 3.5 Why Do Unions Exist? 75 3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 76 3.7 Review Questions 76 3.8 Technical Annex: How Strong Should Unions Be in Order to Be Efficient? 77 Chapter 4: Payroll Taxes 81 4.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 82 4.2 Theory 86 4.3 Empirical Evidence 90 4.4 Policy Issues 92 4.4.1 Negative Income Taxes or In-Work Benefits? 92 4.4.2 Tax Credits orWage Subsidies? 96 4.5 Why Do Payroll Taxes Exist? 97 4.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 98 4.7 Review Questions 98 4.8 Technical Annex: Taxes and Benefits in a Competitive Labor Market 98 Chapter 5: Regulation ofWorking Hours 101 5.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 101 5.2 Theory 102 5.2.1 RegulatingWeeklyWorking Hours 104 5.2.2 Part-TimeWork 107 5.3 Empirical Evidence 109 5.3.1 Working Hours 109 5.3.2 Part-TimeWork 113 5.4 Policy Issues 116 5.4.1 Should Governments RegulateWorking Hours? 116 5.4.2 Should Governments Stimulate Part-Time Labor? 117 5.5 Why Does Regulation ofWorking Hours Exist? 117 5.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 118 5.7 Review Questions 118 5.8 Technical Annex: Reduction of StandardWorking Hours 119 Chapter 6: Retirement Programs 121 6.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 122 6.2 Theory 124 6.3 Empirical Evidence 125 6.3.1 Age and Employment 125 6.3.2 Age and Productivity 132 6.4 Policy Issues 134 6.4.1 Should the Mandatory Retirement Age Be Increased? 134 6.4.2 Should Early Retirement Programs Be Phased Out? 135 6.5 Why Do Early Retirement Programs Exist? 136 6.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 136 6.7 Review Questions 136 6.8 Technical Annex: Optimal Retirement Age 137 Chapter 7: Family Policies 139 7.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 140 7.2 Theory 142 7.2.1 Child Care Facilities 142 7.2.2 Parental Leave 142 7.3 Empirical Evidence 144 7.4 Policy Issues 150 7.4.1 CanWork and Family Life Be Balanced? 150 7.4.2 Is There a Trade-off between Fertility and Employment? 151 7.5 Why Do Family Policies Exist? 153 7.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 153 7.7 Review Questions 154 7.8 Technical Annex: Child Care Facilities and Hours ofWork 154 Chapter 8: Education and Training 157 8.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 158 8.2 Theory 160 8.2.1 Schooling 160 8.2.2 Training 163 8.3 Empirical Evidence 165 8.3.1 Returns to Schooling 165 8.3.2 On-the-Job Training 169 8.4 Policy Issues 170 8.4.1 Should Governments Subsidize In-Company Training? 170 8.4.2 Should There Be a Compulsory Schooling Age? 171 8.5 Why Do Governments Provide Education and Training? 171 8.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 172 8.7 Review Questions 172 8.8 Technical Annex: Schooling and Training 172 8.8.1 OptimalYears of Schooling 172 8.8.2 Who Pays for General Training? 174 Chapter 9: Migration Policies 175 9.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 176 9.2 Theory 178 9.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 179 9.2.2 An Economy withWage Rigidities 180 9.2.3 Wage Rigidities and Unemployment Benefits 181 9.2.4 What Drives Migration Decisions? 182 9.2.5 Effects on Income Distribution of Skill-Biased Migration 183 9.3 Empirical Evidence 184 9.3.1 The Labor Market Performance of Migrants 189 9.3.2 Fiscal Effects 190 9.4 Policy Issues 191 9.4.1 Closing theWelfare Door? 192 9.4.2 Adopting a Points System? 193 9.5 Why Do Migration Policies Exist? 194 9.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 195 9.7 Review Questions 195 9.8 Technical Annex: Net Gains from Migration and the Option Value ofWaiting 195 Chapter 10: Employment Protection Legislation 199 10.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 200 10.2 Theory 204 10.2.1 A Neutrality Result 204 10.2.2 Removing Risk Neutrality 206 10.2.3 EPL with RigidWages 206 10.2.4 EPL as a Tax 209 10.2.5 Two-Tier Regimes 210 10.3 Empirical Evidence 211 10.3.1 Cross-Country Analyses 211 10.3.2 Within-Country Studies 213 10.3.3 Endogeneity of EPL 214 10.4 Policy Issues 215 10.4.1 How Much Protection Should EPL Provide? 215 10.4.2 Whom Should EPL Be Protecting? 218 10.5 Why Does Employment Protection Legislation Exist? 220 10.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 220 10.7 Review Questions 221 10.8 Technical Annex: EPL in a Search-Matching Model 221 10.8.1 A Simple Dynamic Framework 221 10.8.2 Present Discounted and Flow Values 221 10.8.3 Behavior ofWorkers 222 10.8.4 Matching 222 10.8.5 Firms 223 10.8.6 Wage Bargaining 223 10.8.7 Introducing EPL 223 10.8.8 Baseline Parameters 224 Chapter 11: Unemployment Benefits 225 11.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 226 11.2 Theory 230 11.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 230 11.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market 234 11.3 Empirical Evidence 238 11.3.1 Effects on ReservationWage 238 11.3.2 Effects on Unemployment Duration: Aggregate Data 239 11.3.3 Effects on Unemployment Duration: Microeconomic Data 240 11.3.4 Effects of Unemployment on the Generosity of UBs 243 11.4 Policy Issues 244 11.4.1 Why and When Should UBs Be Publicly Provided? 244 11.4.2 What Is the Optimal Structure of UBs? 246 11.5 Why Do Unemployment Benefits Exist? 247 11.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 248 11.7 Review Questions 248 11.8 Technical Annex: UBs in a Search-Matching Model 249 11.8.1 Effects of UBs in a Two-Sided Job Search Model 249 11.8.2 Optimal Job Search Intensity 249 11.8.3 Vacancies and the Matching Function 250 11.8.4 Wage Bargaining 251 11.8.5 Labor Market Participation 251 11.8.6 Balanced Budget 253 11.8.7 Numerical Simulations 253 Chapter 12: Active Labor Market Policies 255 12.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 256 12.2 Theory 258 12.3 Empirical Evidence 263 12.3.1 Experimental Studies 264 12.3.2 Nonexperimental Studies 268 12.4 Policy Issues 270 12.4.1 DoWe Need Public Employment Services? 271 12.4.2 DoWe Need Activation Policies? 271 12.5 Why Do Active Labor Market Policies Exist? 272 12.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 272 12.7 Review Questions 273 12.8 Technical Annex: Activating UnemployedWorkers 273 Chapter 13: Institutional Interactions 277 13.1 Taxes and Unions 278 13.2 Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits 280 13.3 Unemployment Benefits and Active Labor Market Policies 282 13.4 Employment Protection and Unions 284 13.5 Taxes and Unemployment Benefits 285 13.6 Education and Retirement Programs 287 13.7 What Future for These Institutions? 288 References 291 Index 313