
Risk-Adjusted Performance and Bank Governance Structures
Christoph Böhm(Author)
Peter Lang Verlag
Published on 17. December 2012
Book
Hardback
193 pages
978-3-631-63916-0 (ISBN)
Description
This dissertation comprises four essays investigating the impact of bank governance structures on performance, risk, and stability. The first three studies analyze financial expertise of supervisory board members as a governance instrument: The first study focuses on the extent to which supervisory board members may be regarded as financially literate. The second study places emphasis on the impact of expertise on performance, risk, and stability at German savings banks, while the third study comprises the comparison of the mentioned impact at savings and cooperative banks. Finally, the fourth study analyzes the impact of ownership concentration on banks' performance, risk, and stability on a global level.
More details
Series
Thesis
Doctoral thesis
2012
Darmstadt, Techn. Univ.
Edition
New edition
Language
English
Place of publication
Berlin
Germany
Edition type
New edition
Dimensions
Height: 216 mm
Width: 153 mm
Thickness: 15 mm
Weight
390 gr
ISBN-13
978-3-631-63916-0 (9783631639160)
DOI
10.3726/978-3-653-02730-3
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Christoph Böhm
Risk-Adjusted Performance and Bank Governance Structures
Günther Weisenborn, der 20. Juli 1944 und die Rote Kapelle
E-Book
05/2013
150th Edition
Peter Lang Verlag
€70.19
Available for download
Person
Christoph Böhm studied business administration at the University of Mannheim. He earned his doctorate at the Chair of Corporate Finance at the Technische Universität Darmstadt. During his research period he worked for a management consulting company. His current place of employment is with a global reinsurance company.
Content
Contents: The Evident Banking Expertise of Supervisory Board Members of German Cooperative and Savings Banks - Financial Expertise in Supervisory Boards, Bank Performance and Risk-Taking: Evidence from German Savings Banks - Financial Expertise of Supervisory Boards Members, Overconfidence, and Bank Risk-Taking - Bank Performance and Risk: Contest of the Risk Advocate Hypothesis.