
Antitrust Economics
The Quest for Truth
2nd Edition
Published on 8. October 2009
Book
Hardback
496 pages
978-0-19-513535-0 (ISBN)
Description
The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the Untied States. Citing relevant legislation and landmark court cases, the text offers a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues and uses economic theory to evaluate antitrust policy throughout. The clear, accessible prose in Antitrust Economics explains the theory/policy cycle and provides thorough analysis of market structure and business conduct as they relate to antitrust policy. The text moves fluidly from theory to real world court cases to public policy, making it ideal for upper-level economics majors or law school courses in antitrust law.
More details
Edition
2nd edition
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
50 line illustrations
Dimensions
Height: 245 mm
Width: 200 mm
Thickness: 27 mm
Weight
1057 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-513535-0 (9780195135350)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
ROGER D. BLAIR is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and many private parties. DAVID L. KASERMAN is Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. He has over 25 years of experience as a professional economist and has been employed both in government agencies and academic institutions. His research interests are primarily in the fields of applied microeconomics and industrial organization
Content
Antitrust in a Market Economy ; The Case for Competition ; The Case Against Monopoly ; Antitrust Response to Monopoly ; Private Enforcement ; Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power ; The Law of Monopolization ; Exclusionary Practices ; Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing ; Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion ; Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion ; Horizontal Mergers ; Price Discrimination ; The Theory of Vertical Integration ; Vertical Merger Policy ; Maximum Resale Price Fixing ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Tying Arrangements ; Reciprocity ; Exclusive Dealing ; Territorial and Customer Restrictions