
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Cambridge University Press
2nd Edition
Published on 12. August 2013
Book
Hardback
508 pages
978-0-521-83408-7 (ISBN)
Description
There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.
Reviews / Votes
'This is a beautifully clear book on the economics of uncertainty and information. The second edition contains a good deal of valuable new material, such as on the production, transmission, acquisition, and aggregation of information.' Eric Maskin, Harvard University, and Nobel Laureate in EconomicsMore details
Series
Edition
2nd Revised edition
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Edition type
Revised edition
Illustrations
83 Line drawings, unspecified
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 157 mm
Thickness: 34 mm
Weight
968 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-83408-7 (9780521834087)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Sushil Bikhchandani | Jack Hirshleifer | John G. Riley
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
E-Book
01/2014
2nd Edition
Cambridge University Press
€49.99
Available for download

Sushil Bikhchandani
Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
E-Book
08/2013
Cambridge University Press
€42.99
Available for download
Previous edition

Jack Hirshleifer | John G. Riley
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Book
09/1992
Cambridge University Press
€62.00
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Persons
Sushil Bikhchandani is a Professor in the Anderson School of Management Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His teaching and research interests include auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Professor Bikhchandani has published in numerous academic journals, including Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, the Journal of Economic Theory, and Econometrica. Jack Hirshleifer (1925-2005) was an American economist and long-time professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. He taught at the University of Chicago from 1955 to 1960, and thereafter at UCLA until 2001. Professor Hirshleifer was well known for his work on uncertainty and information in economics, the economic analysis of conflict, and bioeconomics. His undergraduate textbook, Price Theory and Applications, went into seven editions. A 1958 article by Hirshleifer began the triumphant comeback of Irving Fisher's theory of capital and interest, now deemed canonical. John G. Riley is the Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. A Fellow of the Econometric Society, his research has appeared in eminent journals such as the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Theory, and the RAND Journal of Economics. Professor Riley is the author of Essential Microeconomics (Cambridge University Press, 2012) and co-author, with the late Jack Hirshleifer, of the first edition of The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Author
University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Los Angeles
Content
Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty; 2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual; 3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum; 4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty; Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions; 6. Information and markets; 7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts; 8. Informational asymmetry and contract design; 9. Competition and hidden knowledge; 10. Market institutions; 11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises; 12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.