
The Logic of Strategy
Oxford University Press Inc
Published on 21. October 1999
Book
Hardback
208 pages
978-0-19-511715-8 (ISBN)
Description
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
11 Zeichnungen
11 line drawings
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 157 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
496 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-511715-8 (9780195117158)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Cristina Bicchieri | Richard Jeffrey | Brian Skyrms
The Logic of Strategy
E-Book
09/1999
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€56.49
Available for download
Persons
Editor
Associate Professor of PhilosophyAssociate Professor of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
Professor of PhilosophyProfessor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Professor of PhilosophyProfessor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine
Content
What is the Logic Strategy? ; Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games ; Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities and Lexicographic Expected Utility ; Solutions Based on Ratifiability and Sure Thing Reasoning ; Undercutting the Ramsey Test for Conditionals ; Aumann's "No Agreement" Theorem Generalized ; Rational Failures of the KK-Principle ; How Much Common Belief is Necessary for a Convention? ; Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma ; Can Free Choice Be Known? ; Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma