
The Dynamics of Norms
Cambridge University Press
Published on 13. November 1996
Book
Hardback
234 pages
978-0-521-56062-7 (ISBN)
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Description
In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current literature this volume will be of particular interest to economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to philosophers of the social sciences.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
16 Line drawings, unspecified
Dimensions
Height: 236 mm
Width: 160 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
514 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-56062-7 (9780521560627)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
New editions

Cristina Bicchieri | Richard Jeffrey | Brian Skyrms
The Dynamics of Norms
Book
04/2009
Cambridge University Press
€50.70
Shipment within 15-20 days
Additional editions

Cristina Bicchieri | Richard Jeffrey | Brian Skyrms
The Dynamics of Norms
Book
04/2009
Cambridge University Press
€50.70
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Editor
Carol and Michael Lowenstein Endowed Term ChairCarnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania
Princeton University, New Jersey
University of California, Irvine
Content
1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod; 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri; 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco; 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning; 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni; 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger; 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford; 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan; 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko; 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.