Saul Kripke
Published on 6. June 2011
Book
Hardback
382 pages
978-0-521-85826-7 (ISBN)
Description
This collection of essays on Saul Kripke and his philosophy is the first and only collection of essays to examine both published and unpublished writings by Kripke. Its essays, written by distinguished philosophers in the field, present a broader picture of Kripke's life and work than has previously been available to scholars of his thought. New topics covered in these essays include vacuous names and names in fiction, Kripke on logicism and de re attitude toward numbers, Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic, Kripke on colour words and his criticism of the primary versus secondary quality distinction, and Kripke's critique of functionalism. These essays not only present Kripke's basic arguments but also engage with the arguments and controversies engendered by his work, providing the most comprehensive analysis of his philosophy and writings available. This collection will become a classic in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Reviews / Votes
"...This is a consistently stimulating book, chocked-full of interesting interpretations of Kripke's philosophy of language. Most of the contributions are instructive and insightful."--George Lazaroiu, PhD, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, New York, Analysis and Metaphysics "If Kripke did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him. If it were necessary to invent K, it would be possible to invent K. If K could be invented by J, and K innovated I, then J could have innovated I. For most ideas, I, recounted or reappraised in this first-rate collection of original essays on Kripke's philosophical work: only K could have innovated I.... Berger's anthology has been a long time coming, but it comes at a good time..."
--Alexis Burgess, Stanford University, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "...this volume is a welcome and eminently worthwhile contribution. It is a very significant event in the history of Kripke scholarship, both in terms of its dissemination of Kripke's unpublished work and in the way that it brings together top scholars in the field to continue grappling with problems developed and inspired by Kripke's published work. Most of these papers are not accessible to neophytes, but this is important reading for experts in these fields."
--Philosophy in Review, Arthur Sullivan, Memorial University
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 150 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
658 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-85826-7 (9780521858267)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Alan Berger
Saul Kripke
E-Book
11/2011
1st Edition
Cambridge University Press
€35.49
Available for download
Person
Alan Berger is a professor of philosophy at Brandeis University and a visiting professor at MIT. He formerly served as director of the Saul Kripke Center and is the author of Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric (2002) and numerous articles in scholarly journals including the Journal of Philosophy and Nous.
Content
Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism, Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief attribution Mark Richard; 10. A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary, secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on Cartesianism and naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff Buechner.