Prejudice
A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology
Published on 4. November 2022
Book
Paperback/Softback
240 pages
978-0-19-288525-8 (ISBN)
Description
Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harms that prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for "non-ideal epistemology" which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more.
Reviews / Votes
... this book provides lucid and thought-provoking descriptions of how people may acquire prejudiced beliefs in fraught socio epistemological environments. * Katherine Puddifoot, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, England, Metascience * This is a well-written and thought-provoking book. It is both philosophically sophisticated and relatively accessible. Advanced students with some background in relevant areas should have no trouble following the broad outline of the argument. Researchers interested in the topics it covers (and it covers quite a few) will gain a lot from reading it. Some of them will find things to disagree with, but that is only to be expected. All told, this is a sophisticated and nuanced account of the epistemology and ethics of prejudice and prejudiced belief. * Robin McKenna, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * ..a thought-provoking account of prejudice, and a case study of the tensions inherent in the non-ideal project. By intertwining discussion of prejudice with a discussion of the appropriate epistemological framework for its evaluation, the book encourages reflection on a series of important methodological questions, and ultimately a broader interrogation of the role of philosophy in the study of prejudice. * Jessie Munton, Philosophical Quarterly * And this is what makes Begby's work so informative and such a landmark in non-ideal epistemology, for by demonstrating how prejudice accords with our normal cognitive operations, it centers the humanity of all involved, even those perpetrators of so much so-called "inhumanity." * Guy Lancaster, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books * This book provides lucid and thought provoking descriptions of how people may acquire prejudiced beliefs in fraught socio-epistemological environments. * Katherine Puddifoot, Metascience * The book does an excellent job motivating inquiry into what a system of epistemic norms for agents with our specific cognitive and situational limitations would look like. * Renee Jorgensen, Ethics *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Unsewn / adhesive bound
Dimensions
Height: 206 mm
Width: 137 mm
Thickness: 20 mm
Weight
272 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-288525-8 (9780192885258)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Endre Begby received his MA degree from the University of Oslo and his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Simon Fraser University. His areas of specialization include epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, as well as social and political philosophy.
Content
Preface
1: Prejudice from an epistemological point of view
2: The psychology of stereotypes
3: From psychology to philosophy: the case for non-ideal epistemology
4: The epistemology of prejudice acquisition
5: The epistemology of prejudice maintenance
6: Evidential preemption
7: Common ground: the peculiar epistemology of culturally normal belief
8: Automated risk assessment in the criminal justice process: a case of algorithmic bias ?
9: Moral constraints on belief?
10: A better approach: moral responsibility despite epistemic blamelessness
References
1: Prejudice from an epistemological point of view
2: The psychology of stereotypes
3: From psychology to philosophy: the case for non-ideal epistemology
4: The epistemology of prejudice acquisition
5: The epistemology of prejudice maintenance
6: Evidential preemption
7: Common ground: the peculiar epistemology of culturally normal belief
8: Automated risk assessment in the criminal justice process: a case of algorithmic bias ?
9: Moral constraints on belief?
10: A better approach: moral responsibility despite epistemic blamelessness
References