Deflationism and Paradox
Published on 8. May 2008
Book
Paperback/Softback
290 pages
978-0-19-954492-9 (ISBN)
Description
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 16 mm
Weight
445 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-954492-9 (9780199544929)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Jc Beall | Bradley Armour-Garb
Deflationism and Paradox
Book
11/2005
Oxford University Press
€175.40
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
JC Beall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut.
Bradley Armour-Garb is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Albany, SUNY
Bradley Armour-Garb is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Albany, SUNY
Content
Introduction ; 1. Transparent disquotationalism ; 2. Is the Liar sentence both true and false? ; 3. Spiking the field artillery ; 4. Variations on a theme by Yablo ; 5. A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth ; 6. Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox ; 7. Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too ; 8. Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes ; 9. Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism? ; 10. Semantics for deflationists ; 11. How significant is the Liar? ; 12. The deflationists' axioms for truth ; 13. Naive truth and sophisticated logic ; 14. Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes