Intelligence Success and Failure
The Human Factor
Published on 20. April 2017
Book
Paperback/Softback
280 pages
978-0-19-934174-0 (ISBN)
Description
The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems.
Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.
Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes.
Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.
Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.
Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes.
Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.
Reviews / Votes
"Bar-Joseph and McDermott develop a theoretical framework related to the human factor in explaining success and failure in three wars: the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941; the Korean War in 1950; and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973... Recommended."--CHOICE
"Psychological dysfunctions have long been a preoccupation of post-mortems on intelligence failures. Bar-Joseph and McDermott contribute important insights of this sort regarding failures in warning and response. More importantly, however, they go further to apply them in powerful ways to the all-too neglected dimension of intelligence studies: cases of success in assessment and decision. Their study provides new perspectives on old cases and useful lessons
for future analysts."
--Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and author of Enemies of Intelligence
"This fascinating book, based on a series of important case studies, moves the reader squarely into the realm of psychology - a discipline too often ignored in political science and national security studies - as these outstanding authors search for reasons why some policymakers are unable to understand and cope with indicators that point toward an incipient surprise attack."
--Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of International Affairs, University of Georgia
"This finely crafted study makes a major contribution to the intelligence literature. It is an extraordinary combination of theory and historical detail that enriches and adds a new dimension to our understanding of intelligence and deterrence failure."
--James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
"The field is full of studies of intelligence failures, but a good understanding of them requires comparisons to intelligence successes. Bar-Joseph and McDermott have done this brilliantly, extending both our theoretical grasp of the subject and the empirical knowledge of important cases."
--Robert Jervis, Author of Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
"This is the most significant step forward in years in the literature on the warning of surprise by intelligence services and leaders' response to warnings. It should be required reading for students of intelligence, national security policy making, and history."
--Michael Morell, former Acting Director, Deputy Director, and Chief Analyst, the Central Intelligence Agency
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
481 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-934174-0 (9780199341740)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
04/2017
Oxford University Press Inc
€210.60
Shipment within 15-20 days
E-Book
03/2017
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€22.99
Available for download
E-Book
03/2017
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€22.99
Available for download
Persons
Uri Bar-Joseph is a Professor at the School of Political Science, Haifa University, Israel. He concentrates on strategic and intelligence studies, especially focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli security policy. In addition to numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters, he wrote six books, the most recent of which is The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel (2016).
Rose McDermott is the David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University and a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Women and Public Policy Program, all at Harvard University. She has been a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences twice. She is the author of four books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over a hundred academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.
Rose McDermott is the David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University and a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Women and Public Policy Program, all at Harvard University. She has been a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences twice. She is the author of four books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over a hundred academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.
Content
Contents
Introduction
Part One: The Theoretical Framework
Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion
Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process
Part Two: The Empirical Evidence
The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow
Case Study I: The Failure
Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow
The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War
Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War
Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950
The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur
Case Study I: The Failure
Case Study II: The Success
Chapter VI. Conclusions
Introduction
Part One: The Theoretical Framework
Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion
Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process
Part Two: The Empirical Evidence
The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow
Case Study I: The Failure
Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow
The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War
Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War
Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950
The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur
Case Study I: The Failure
Case Study II: The Success
Chapter VI. Conclusions