
Signalling Games in Political Science
J. Banks(Author)
Routledge (Publisher)
1st Edition
Published on 6. December 2001
Book
Hardback
100 pages
978-0-415-26946-9 (ISBN)
Description
Considers the impact of game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics paying particular attention to the presence of information asymmetries.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 222 mm
Width: 145 mm
Thickness: 9 mm
Weight
270 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-415-26946-9 (9780415269469)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
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12/2013
1st Edition
Routledge
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E-Book
10/2013
1st Edition
Routledge
€64.49
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E-Book
10/2013
1st Edition
Routledge
€64.49
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Person
Jeffrey S Banks
Content
Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 The Basic Model; Chapter 3 Agenda Control; Chapter 4 Rhetoric and Debate; Chapter 5 Electoral Competition; Chapter 6 Reputation and Leadership; Chapter 7 Crisis Bargaining; Chapter 8 Voting with Incomplete Information; Chapter 9 Discussion;