
Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge
Oxford University Press
Published on 1. January 2005
Book
Hardback
306 pages
978-0-19-726291-7 (ISBN)
Description
Eleven papers by distinguished British and American philosophers are brought together in this volume. Five of the contributors engage in effect in a running debate about knowledge. How does knowledge relate to evidence? How reliable need one be to have knowledge? Once sceptical doubt has been introduced is there any untainted evidence to show that it is misplaced? Does verificationism succeed in showing that scepticism is untenable? Or is there a natural propensity for belief which explains why we are not in fact sceptics? The other six tackle questions about logic and its relation to language. Can one give a 'realist' account of logical truth without supposing that logic has a subject-matter? How do theories of descriptions fare when tested by their handling of functions? How can indirect speech report someone's use of words like 'this'? Does our language count for or against adopting second-order logic? These papers, given in the British Academy Philosophical Lectures series, are all examples of recent philosophy at its best.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 243 mm
Width: 163 mm
Thickness: 21 mm
Weight
632 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-726291-7 (9780197262917)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Thomas Baldwin is a Reader in French at the University of Kent.
Content
Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge ; Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability ; Facts and Certainty ; Advice to Philosophers: Three New Leaves to Turn Over ; Two Types of Naturalism ; The Theory of Descriptions ; Understanding Logical ConstantsL A Realist's Account ; Indexicals and Reported Speech ; Reported Indexicals ; On Higher-Order Logic and Natural Language ; On Motivating Higher-Order Logic