Positive Political Theory II
Strategy and Structure
Published on 5. January 2005
Book
Paperback/Softback
472 pages
978-0-472-06894-4 (ISBN)
Description
"A major piece of work . . . a classic. There is no
other book like it."
-Norman Schofield, Washington University
"The authors succeed brilliantly in tackling a large
number of important questions concerning the
interaction among voters and elected representatives
in the political arena, using a common, rigorous
language."
-Antonio Merlo, University of Pennsylvania
Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure
is the second volume in Jeffrey Banks and David
Austen-Smith's monumental study of the links
between individual preferences and collective choice.
The book focuses on representative systems, including
both elections and legislative decision-making
processes, clearly connecting individual preferences to
collective outcomes. This book is not a survey. Rather,
it is the coherent, cumulative result of the authors'
brilliant efforts to indirectly connect preferences to
collective choice through strategic behaviors such as
agenda-selection and voting.
The book will be an invaluable reference and teaching
tool for economists and political scientists, and an
essential companion to any scholar interested in the
latest theoretical advances in positive political theory.
other book like it."
-Norman Schofield, Washington University
"The authors succeed brilliantly in tackling a large
number of important questions concerning the
interaction among voters and elected representatives
in the political arena, using a common, rigorous
language."
-Antonio Merlo, University of Pennsylvania
Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure
is the second volume in Jeffrey Banks and David
Austen-Smith's monumental study of the links
between individual preferences and collective choice.
The book focuses on representative systems, including
both elections and legislative decision-making
processes, clearly connecting individual preferences to
collective outcomes. This book is not a survey. Rather,
it is the coherent, cumulative result of the authors'
brilliant efforts to indirectly connect preferences to
collective choice through strategic behaviors such as
agenda-selection and voting.
The book will be an invaluable reference and teaching
tool for economists and political scientists, and an
essential companion to any scholar interested in the
latest theoretical advances in positive political theory.
Reviews / Votes
Explores the connection between individuals' preferences within any society and the collective choices of that society, taking an indirect or game- theoretic approach to the aggregation of individual preferences." -Journal of Economic LiteratureMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
numerous equations and calculations
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
ISBN-13
978-0-472-06894-4 (9780472068944)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
David Austen-Smith is Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy and Professor of Political Science and Economics at Northwestern University.
The late Jeffrey S. Banks was Professor of Political Science at California Institute of Technology.
The late Jeffrey S. Banks was Professor of Political Science at California Institute of Technology.
Content
Acknowledgments vii; Preface ix; 1 Preliminaries 1; 1.1 Review 1; 1.2 Decision theory 8; 1.3 Discussion 17; 1.4 Exercises 17; 1.5 Further reading 18; 2 Strategy-Proof Collective Choice 19; 2.1 Strategy-proofness on finite sets 20; 2.2 Application: The amendment rule 29; 2.3 Strategy-proofness and Arrovian aggregation 30; 2.4 Single-peaked preferences 33; 2.5 Application: The amendment rule revisited 51; 2.6 Strategy-proofness in the spatial model 52; 2.7 Application: The issue-by-issue rule 60; 2.8 Separable preferences 62; 2.9 Discussion 65; 2.10 Exercises 66; 2.11 Further reading 67; 3 Implementable Collective Choice 69; 3.1 Mechanisms and equilibria 70; 3.2 The Revelation Principle 74; 3.3 Nash implementation 77; 3.4 Application: Monotonicity of electoral rules 90; 3.5 Quasi-linear preferences 94; 3.6 Application: Collective action 104; 3.7 Discussion 105; 3.8 Exercises 109; 3.9 Further reading 110; 4 Binary Agendas 113; 4.1 Binary agendas and sophisticated voting 114; 4.2 Equilibrium outcomes of binary agendas 128; 4.3 Application: Agenda independence 138; 4.4 Discussion 141; 4.5 Exercises 144; 4.6 Further reading 146; 5 Spatial Voting in Committees 147; 5.1 Issue-by-issue voting in the spatial model 148; 5.2 Application: Committees and cabinets 158; 5.3 Endogenous agendas 166; 5.4 Application: Sophisticated sincerity 184; 5.5 Discussion 186; 5.6 Exercises 188; 5.7 Further reading 190; 6 Legislative Bargaining 193; 6.1 A basic framework 194; 6.2 Bargaining over distributions 204; 6.3 Application: Pork barrel politics 221; 6.4 Bargaining over policy 224; 6.5 Application: Coalition government formation 244; 6.6 Discussion 248; 6.7 Exercises 250; 6.8 Further reading 251; 7 Two-Candidate Elections 253; 7.1 Electoral equilibrium and the core 254; 7.2 Application: Ideological convergence 259; 7.3 Equilibrium in multidimensional spaces 262; 7.4 Application: Progressive taxation 280; 7.5 Probabilistic voting 282; 7.6 Application: Director's Law 289; 7.7 Policy-motivated candidates 293; 7.8 Application: Ideological divergence 301; 7.9 Turnout 304; 7.10 Discussion 322; 7.11 Exercises 328; 7.12 Further reading 330; 8 Multicandidate Elections 333; 8.1 Sincere voting in multicandidate elections 335; 8.2 Application: Comparing electoral rules 342; 8.3 Strategic voting 344; 8.4 Application: Duverger's Law 352; 8.5 Candidate entry 353; 8.6 Application: Duverger and divergence 380; 8.7 Discussion 382; 8.8 Exercises 388; 8.9 Further reading 389; 9 Legislative Elections 391; 9.1 Elections, government and policy 392; 9.2 Application: Representative legislatures 413; 9.3 Discussion 415; 9.4 Exercises 416; 9.5 Further reading 417; 10 Summary and Conclusions 419; 10.1 Retrospective 421; 10.2 A conclusion 427; Bibliography 429; Index 445