
Assertion and Conditionals
Anthony Appiah(Author)
Cambridge University Press
Published on 19. September 1985
Book
Hardback
288 pages
978-0-521-30411-5 (ISBN)
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Description
This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 216 mm
Width: 138 mm
Thickness: 20 mm
Weight
480 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-30411-5 (9780521304115)
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Anthony Appiah
Assertion and Conditionals
Book
08/2008
Cambridge University Press
€48.60
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Additional editions

Anthony Appiah
Assertion and Conditionals
Book
08/2008
Cambridge University Press
€48.60
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
1. Cartesianism, behaviourism and the philosophical context; Part I. Belief: 2. A theory of the mind; 3. Belief and decision; 4. Computation; 5. Truth conditions; Part II. Meaning: 6. Realism and truth-theory; 7. Assertion; Part III. Conditionals: 8. Indicative conditionals; 9. Truth and triviality; 10. Logic without truth; 11. Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals.