Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem
Description
This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand "the mind-body problem". The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as "what it is like" to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of "what-it-is-like" as "the hard problem" of consciousness and claims that this problem is so "hard" that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate - that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific "biological naturalist" views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem.
An essential read for anyone who believes that nosatisfactory solution to "the mind-body problem" has yet been discovered.
Reviews / Votes
"Freud abandoned his Project for a Scientific Psychology [1895] on the grounds that science had not yet been developed in ways that would make it useful to those aspects of psychology he was interested in. But the abandonment was accompanied by a claim that a more thoroughly developed science (biological/neuroscientific and behavioural) would support the central claims of psychoanalysis. Anderson's book intends to make good on aspects of Freud's claim. A growing part of Freud's legacy is its implications for a wide range of issues in psychology, biology and neuroscience. Anderson's book is extensively researched and intriguingly engages with the prominent issues and researchers in the relevant fields. I highly recommend it." (Michael P. Levine, Professor Emeritus, The University of Western Australia)"Anderson's book is a bracing exercise in biological naturalism, defending a physicalist account of the mental that merits serious attention. One reason for this is that Andersonengages with an unusual and fruitful selection of contrasts and allies that is wider and more varied than most treatments, including Ryle and Freud, as well as the more familiar Searle, Chalmers and Patricia Churchland. Another is how the position defended aims to accommodate crucial phenomena, notably including hydranencephaly (absence of cortex), and take seriously the importance - indeed the possible primacy - of affect for mentality and awareness. Both features make this book an instructive and valuable contribution." (David Spurrett, Professor of Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal)
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