Judicial Dis-Appointments

Judicial Appointments Reform and the Rise of European Judicial Independence
 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 11. Oktober 2020
  • |
  • 464 Seiten
 
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-0-19-263957-8 (ISBN)
 
In 2009 and 2010, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights underwent significant reforms to their respective judicial appointments processes. Though very different judicial institutions, they adopted very similar - and rather remarkable - reforms: each would now make use of an expert panel of judicial notables to vet the candidates proposed to sit in Luxembourg or Strasbourg. Once established, these two vetting panels then followed with actions no less extraordinary: they each immediately took to rejecting a sizable percentage of the judicial candidates proposed by the Member State governments. What had happened? Why would the Member States of the European Union and of the Council of Europe, which had established judicial appointments processes that all but ensured themselves the unfettered power to designate their preferred judges to the European courts, and who had zealously maintained and exercised that power over the course of some fifty years, suddenly decide to undermine their own capacity to continue to do so? This book sets out to solve this mystery. Its point of departure is that it would be a mistake to view the 2009-2010 establishment of the two vetting panels in isolation from other European judicial developments. Though these acts of institutional creation are certainly the most notable recent developments, they actually represent but the crowning achievement of a process of European judicial appointments reform that has been running unremittingly since the 1990's. This longstanding and tenacious movement has actually triggered a broad set of interrelated debates and reforms, encompassing not only judicial appointments per se, but also a much wider set of issues, including judicial independence, judicial quality, judicial councils, the separation of powers, judicial gender equity, and more.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 43,20 MB
978-0-19-263957-8 (9780192639578)
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Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser is the Jack G. Clarke Professor of Law, Director of Graduate Studies, and co-directs the Cornell Summer Institute of International and Comparative Law in Paris. He teaches and writes in the areas of comparative law, law of the European Union, comparative constitutional law, and judicial process.
  • COVER
  • HALF TITLE
  • Judicial Dis-Appointments
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Introduction
  • PART I
  • 2. The Prehistory and History of the 255 Panel
  • I. The ECSC Negotiations
  • II. The ECJ's 1995 Report
  • III. The 2000 Ole Due Report
  • IV. The 2003 Constitutional Convention's Discussion Circle on the?ECJ
  • V. The Treaty of Lisbon
  • 3. The 255 Panel in Operation
  • I. The Establishment of the Panel
  • II. The 255 Panel's Work
  • A. The Panel's Decisions
  • 1. Introduction: the lack of transparency
  • 2. The numbers
  • B. The Activity Reports
  • C. "Personal" Publications
  • III. Conclusion
  • PART II
  • 4. The Prehistory and History of the?APE
  • I. History: Back to the Beginning
  • II. The Judicial Appointments Developments
  • 5. The APE in Operation
  • I. The Early Days
  • II. The Storm Hits
  • III. The Response
  • IV. Conclusion
  • PART III
  • 6. The Primary Literature: Taking Measures (and More Measures)
  • I. The Committee of Ministers' 1994 Recommendation "On the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges"
  • II. The 1998 European Charter on the Statute for Judges
  • III. The CCJE's 2001 Opinion No.?1
  • IV. The Venice Commission Reports
  • V. Concluding Trends
  • 7. The Secondary Literature: What to Make of Judicial Independence?
  • I. By Way of Introduction: Classics Old and?New
  • II. The Tactical Turn
  • III. An Independent Take on European Judicial Independence and Accountability
  • A. Judicial Independence or Judicial Accountability?
  • 1. Judicial independence
  • 2. Judicial accountability
  • B. Judicial Accountability?
  • C. European Judges?
  • D. European Judges? On European Uncertainty
  • IV. Conclusion
  • PART IV
  • 8. Formalization and Judicial Quality
  • I. Formalization
  • A. Procedural Formalization
  • B. Substantive/?Normative Formalization
  • C. Institutional Formalization
  • II. The Rise of Judicial Quality
  • A. The EU and Council of Europe Debates
  • B. The Academic Debates
  • 9. Formalized Quality in Operation
  • I. Removing and Imposing Control
  • II. Judicial Quality as a Loaded Mediating Device
  • III. Recognizing Historical Exceptions
  • IV. Conclusion: A Supple Formalization
  • PART V
  • 10. The Juicy Bits
  • I. The 1998 Bulgarian Appointment
  • II. The 2001 Moldovan Appointment
  • III. The 2004 Slovak Appointment
  • IV. The 2004 Estonian Appointment
  • V. The 2011 French Appointment
  • VI. The 2012 Czech Appointment
  • VII. Temporary Conclusion
  • 11. Scandal Theory in Context
  • I. The Core of Scandal Theory
  • A. The Scandalous Event
  • B. Claim of Violation of Norms
  • C. Revelation to a Public
  • D. Contested Norms or Values
  • E. Unfolding over Time
  • F. Public Disapproval .?.?. or?not
  • II. Scandal Theory in Action
  • A. The Scandalous Event
  • B. Claim of Violation of Norms
  • C. Leadership Struggles: The Construction of Inter-?Institutional Allegiances
  • D. The Formation of Identities and Interests
  • III. Conclusions
  • PART VI
  • 12. Different Ways to Connect the Dots
  • I. Strand #1: The Supranational Transplantation of Institutional Forms: The Rise and Spread of Judicial Councils
  • II. Strand #2: The Legal and Professional Normalization of the European Courts
  • A. The Legalization and De-?Internationalization of the International/?Supranational
  • B. The Legalization and De-?Constitutionalization of the International/?Supranational
  • III. Strand #3: Judicial/?Judicial Dynamics
  • A. Practical Inter-?Institutional Politics: The European Courts' Efforts to Promote Buy-?In from Member State Courts
  • B. Inter-?Institutional Domestication: The Member State Judiciaries' Influence over the European Courts
  • IV. Strand #4: Separation of Powers Developments
  • V. Strand #5: The "Neoliberal" Turn: The Empowered and Disempowered Judiciary
  • VI. Strand #6: Neo-?Institutionalism: Unintended Consequences?
  • VII. Strand #7: The Construction of Elite Judicial Power
  • VIII. Transitional Conclusion
  • 13. A Crisis in Legitimacy and Authority
  • I. The Orthodox Analysis and Prescription
  • II. Reasons for Skepticism
  • A. Çali et al.: Self-?Referential Professional Perceptions
  • B. British Eurosceptics and the Tabloid Press
  • 1. Ignorance/?misinformation about the European Courts
  • 2. The ECJ's legitimacy shortage
  • C. Challenging the Orthodox Account
  • 1. Option 1: The European Courts are beside the point
  • 2. Option 2: The critiques really are about the European Courts .?.?.
  • 14. Conclusion: Disentangling Three Types of Judicial Legitimacy
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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