To Do, To Die, To Reason Why

Individual Ethics in War
 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 18. Juni 2020
  • |
  • 336 Seiten
 
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-0-19-256729-1 (ISBN)
 
To Do, To Die, To Reason Why offers a new account of the ethics of war and the legal regulation of war. It is especially concerned with the conduct of individuals, including whether they are required to follow orders to go to war, what moral constraints there are on killing in war, what makes people liable to be killed in war, and the extent to which the laws of war ought to reflect the morality of war. Victor Tadros defends a largely anti-authority view about the morality of war, and notable moral constraints on killing in war, such as the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, he argues that a much wider range of people are liable to be harmed or killed in war than is normally thought to be the case, on grounds of both causal involvement and fairness. And it argues that the laws of war should converge much more closely with the morality of war than is currently the case.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 2,02 MB
978-0-19-256729-1 (9780192567291)
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Victor Tadros is Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theory at the University of Warwick. Prior to joining Warwick, he held positions at the University of Aberdeen and the University of Edinburgh. In the Fall 2015, he was Carter Visiting Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School. He is the sole author of three previous books with OUP: Criminal Responsibility (2005), The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (2011) and Wrongs and Crimes (2016). From 2014-2018 he held a Major Leverhulme Research Fellowship, and in 2018 he was elected Fellow of the British Academy.
  • Cover
  • To Do, To Die, To Reason Why
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1 Humanizing War
  • 1.1 Vietnam
  • 1.2 Totalizing Humanity in War
  • 1.3 Politics, Groups, and Individuals
  • 1.4 A Plan of the Book
  • 2 The Morality of Harm: In and Out of War
  • 2.1 Is War Special?
  • 2.1.2 Social and Moral Rules
  • 2.1.3 Institutional and Non-Institutional Views
  • 2.1.4 Real and Hypothetical Agreements
  • 2.1.5 The Facts of War
  • 2.2 Individuals, Relationships, and Groups
  • 2.2.1 Individuals, Groups, and Agency
  • 2.2.2 The Grounds of Liability
  • 2.3 Conclusion
  • 3 Fighting for One's Own
  • 3.1 Wars and Conduct in Wars
  • 3.1.1 Against Traditionalism
  • 3.1.2 Dividing Responsibility
  • 3.2 The Limited Importance of Democracy
  • 3.2.1 A Non-Instrumental Argument for the Significance of Democracy
  • 3.2.2 Evidence and Authority
  • 3.2.3 Respect for Democratic Authority
  • 3.3 Contracts and Conscription
  • 3.4 Can Associative Relationships Ground Permissions to Kill?
  • 3.4.1 Relationships, Reasons, and Protection
  • 3.4.2 Can the Value of Interpersonal Relationships Override Rights?
  • 3.4.3 Lazar's Transitivity Argument
  • 3.5 Why it Is Sometimes Permissible to Participate in Unjust Wars
  • 3.6 Conclusion
  • 4 Against Following Orders
  • 4.1 How to Follow Orders
  • 4.1.1 Giving Orders
  • 4.1.2 Following Orders
  • 4.2 The Basic Case against the Duty to Follow Orders
  • 4.2.1 Ignoring the Order
  • 4.2.2 Ordering and Duties
  • 4.2.3 Is There an Additional Duty to Follow Orders?
  • 4.3 The Point of Issuing Orders
  • 4.4 Decision-Making and the Duty to Follow Orders
  • 4.4.1 The Service Conception of Authority
  • 4.4.2 Decision Procedures and Actions
  • 4.4.3 Conditional and Unconditional Duties
  • 4.4.4 A Brief Excursus on Raz
  • 4.5 Duties and Information
  • 4.6 Coordination
  • 4.7 Conclusion
  • 5 Personal and Interpersonal Sources of Doing and Allowing
  • 5.1 Doing and Allowing
  • 5.2 Partiality and the Value of Persons
  • 5.2.1 Partiality, Rescue, and Harm
  • 5.2.2 A General Argument for Partiality
  • 5.3 Personal Resources
  • 5.4 A Relational Argument
  • 5.4.1 Involvement
  • 5.4.2 Respect, Prevention, and Promotion
  • 5.5 Understanding Doing and Allowing and its Stringency
  • 5.5.1 Thomson's View
  • 5.5.2 Three Dimensions of Stringency
  • 5.6 Conclusion
  • 6 The Significance of Intentions
  • 6.1 Consequentialism and the Significance of Intentions
  • 6.2 Non-Consequentialism and Bad Intentions
  • 6.2.1 A Brief Case for the Significance of Bad Intentions
  • 6.2.3 Choosing Intentions
  • 6.2.4 Discouraging Wrongdoing
  • 6.3 Intending Harm or What Is Close to Harm
  • 6.4 Prerogatives, Duties, and Using
  • 6.4.1 Prerogatives as Partial Ground of the Wrongness of Using
  • 6.4.2 Autonomy and Heteronomy
  • 6.4.3 Using, Affecting, and Heteronomy
  • 6.5 Using and Usefulness
  • 6.6 Using Combatants
  • 6.7 Conclusion
  • 7 Responsibility and Liability
  • 7.1 Option and Brute Luck: An Incomplete View
  • 7.2 Why Options Are Not Always Decisive
  • 7.3 Treating Others as Though They Are Liable
  • 7.4 Culpability and Choice
  • 7.4.1 Unavoidable Harm
  • 7.4.2 Avoidability and Culpability
  • 7.4.3 Free Will and Determinism
  • 7.5 Culpability and Connection
  • 7.6 Meeting the Challenge of Free Will
  • 7.7 Conclusion
  • 8 Killing and Aggregation
  • 8.1 Multiple Threats and Liability
  • 8.1.1 Minimally and Highly Culpable Threats
  • 8.1.2 Necessity, Narrow Proportionality, and Highly Culpable Threats
  • 8.2 Restricted Aggregationism and Culpability
  • 8.3 Holding the Past Equal
  • 8.3.1 Some Methodological Suggestions
  • 8.3.2 Compatibilism
  • 8.3.3 Incompatibilism
  • 8.4 Conclusion
  • 9 Why It Is Wrong to Kill Non-Responsible Threats
  • 9.1 Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Arguments
  • 9.2 The Agent-Neutral Challenge
  • 9.3 Thomson's View
  • 9.4 Duties and Permissions
  • 9.5 Different Bystanders
  • 9.6 No Duty without Choice
  • 9.7 The Irrelevance of Duties
  • 9.8 Why It Is Wrong for Third Parties to Kill Non-Responsible Threats
  • 9.9 Agent-Relative Considerations
  • 9.9.2 Agent-Relativity, Personal Resources, and Harm
  • 9.9.3 Shifting the Costs of Just Actions
  • 9.10 Conclusion
  • 10 Causation and Liability
  • 10.1 Is Causation Necessary for Liability?
  • 10.1.1 Hiring and Causation
  • 10.1.2 Complicity and Beyond
  • 10.1.3 Inchoate Liability without Pre-emption
  • 10.2 Causal Contributions in Just War Theory
  • 10.3 Context and Methodology
  • 10.4 Portion of the Threat
  • 10.5 Portion of the Cause
  • 10.6 Personal Causation
  • 10.7 Causing and Enabling
  • 10.8 Lewis-Style Influence
  • 10.9 Overdetermination, Pre-emption, and Causal Contribution
  • 10.9.1 Overdetermination
  • 10.9.2 Overdetermination, Permissibility, and Liability
  • 10.9.3 Culpable Overdetermination
  • 10.10 Probabilistic Causation
  • 10.11 Proximity
  • 10.12 Conclusion
  • 11 Sharing the Costs of War
  • 11.1 Is it Worse for the Unjust to Kill Non-Combatants?
  • 11.2 The Choices of Combatants
  • 11.2.1 Contrastive Consent
  • 11.2.2 Can We Contrastively Consent to Be Killed?
  • 11.2.3 Contrastive Consent and the Value of One's Own Life
  • 11.3 Occupational Choice
  • 11.4 Sharing the Costs of Unjust Wars
  • 11.4.1 Fairness and Fair Play
  • 11.4.2 The Unskilled and the Unable
  • 11.5 Sharing the Costs of Injustice
  • 11.5.1 Evidence-Relative Permissibility
  • 11.5.2 Culpability and Fairness
  • 11.6 Conclusion
  • 12 Why Law and Morality Should Converge
  • 12.1 How to Approach the Laws of War
  • 12.1.1 Empirical Speculation and the Laws of War
  • 12.1.2 Institutional Design
  • 12.1.3 The Morality of Examining the Laws of War
  • 12.2 Why Converge?
  • 12.3 The Aims and Functions of the LOAC
  • 12.3.1 The Aims of the LOAC
  • 12.3.2 Three Functions of the LOAC
  • 12.4 Guiding Just Combat
  • 12.5 Bad Effects of the Law
  • 12.5.1 Biased and Unjust Enforcement
  • 12.5.2 Reducing the Incentives not to Commit More Egregious Wrongs
  • 12.5.3 Reducing Effectiveness on the Just Side
  • 12.6 Moral and Legal Non-Immunity: A Rough Proposal
  • 12.7 Why Converge (Again)?
  • 12.7.1 Why Strict Non-Combatant Immunity Is Harmful and Encourages Wrongful Killing
  • 12.7.2 Punishing the Righteous
  • 12.7.3 Disincentives
  • 12.7.4 Symbolism
  • 12.8 The Costs of Qualified Legal Immunity
  • 12.8.1 Attacks on Non-Combatants by the Unjust Side
  • 12.8.2 Abuse of the Rule
  • 12.8.3 Collateral Damage
  • 12.8.4 An Immunity Culture
  • 12.9 Conclusion
  • 13 Accountability for Wrongdoing in War
  • 13.1 Systematic Accountability for Violating the Law
  • 13.2 Appropriateness and External Norms
  • 13.2.1 Establishment and Response
  • 13.2.2 Appropriateness Norms
  • 13.2.3 External Norms
  • 13.3 Responsibility and Accountability for Wrongdoing in War
  • 13.3.1 What Is Responsibility
  • 13.3.2 Responsibility for Unjust Killing in War
  • 13.4 Justifications and Excuses
  • 13.4.1 Evidence-Relative Justification
  • 13.4.2 Excuses
  • 13.5 Responding to Wrongdoing
  • 13.5.1 Excuses and the Duty View of Punishment
  • 13.5.2 Punishment and the Burdens of Warfare
  • 13.6 Responding to Mass Wrongdoing, and Responding to Wrongdoing on Mass
  • 13.7 Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Hypothetical Cases
  • Name Index
  • Subject Index

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