A Companion to Experimental Philosophy

 
 
Wiley-Blackwell (Verlag)
  • erschienen am 28. März 2016
  • |
  • 640 Seiten
 
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-1-118-66168-0 (ISBN)
 
This is a comprehensive collection of essays that explores cutting-edge work in experimental philosophy, a radical new movement that applies quantitative and empirical methods to traditional topics of philosophical inquiry.
* Situates the discipline within Western philosophy and then surveys the work of experimental philosophers by sub-discipline
* Contains insights for a diverse range of fields, including linguistics, cognitive science, anthropology, economics, and psychology, as well as almost every area of professional philosophy today
* Edited by two rising scholars who take a broad and inclusive approach to the field
* Offers a complete introduction for non-specialists and students to the central approaches, findings, challenges, and controversies in experimental philosophy
1. Auflage
  • Englisch
  • Hoboken
  • |
  • Großbritannien
John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • Für Beruf und Forschung
  • 8,62 MB
978-1-118-66168-0 (9781118661680)
1118661680 (1118661680)
weitere Ausgaben werden ermittelt
  • Title Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Notes on Contributors
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Part I: Experimental Philosophy
  • 1 Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 What Are Philosophical Intuitions?
  • 1.3 Why Do Experimental Philosophers Want to Study Philosophical Intuitions Using the Methods of Empirical Science?
  • 1.4 The Expertise Defense
  • References
  • 2 Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 "Philosophical Intuitions"
  • 2.3 Proper Domains for the Application of Concepts
  • 2.4 Further Questions about the Parity Defense
  • 2.5 Acts of Judging and Evidence
  • 2.6 Error-fragility
  • References
  • 3 Experimental Philosophy Is Cognitive Science
  • 3.1
  • 3.2
  • 3.3
  • 3.4
  • 3.5
  • 3.6
  • 3.7
  • 3.8
  • Acknowledgment
  • References
  • 4 Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Three Experimentalist Challenges to the Armchair
  • 4.3 What Is Armchair Philosophy?
  • 4.4 Rebutting the Three Experimentalist Challenges, Experimentally
  • 4.5 Empirically Extending and Enhancing the Reach of the Armchair
  • 4.6 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgment
  • References
  • 5 Going Positive by Going Negative
  • 5.1 On the Philosophical Relevance and Methodological Danger of Experimental Philosophy
  • 5.2 The Prehistory of X-phi: Armchair Philosophy's Reliance on Armchair Psychology
  • 5.3 Noise, Signal, and Experimental Philosophy
  • 5.4 Going Positive By Going Negative
  • 5.5 X-phi Tools for the (Philosophical) Masses?
  • References
  • 6 Early Modern Experimental Philosophy1
  • 6.1 Experimental Philosophy and Experiments
  • 6.2 Experimental Philosophy and Experimental Natural History
  • 6.3 Experimental Philosophy and Medicine
  • 6.4 Newtonianism and Experimental Philosophy
  • 6.5 Experimental Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Holland and France
  • 6.6 Experimental Philosophy and Moral Philosophy
  • 6.7 The Eclipse of Early Modern Experimental Philosophy
  • 6.8 Early Modern Experimental Philosophy and Contemporary x-phi
  • References
  • 7 Nietzsche and Moral Psychology
  • 7.1 Moralities are Symptoms of the Affects
  • 7.2 The Doctrine of Types
  • 7.3 Epiphenomenalism
  • 7.4 Nietzsche's Strength Model of Self-Control
  • 7.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • Part II: Areas of Research
  • A. Free Will and Philosophy of Action
  • 8 The Folk Concept of Intentional Action
  • 8.1 Two Puzzles for Intentional Action: The Knobe Effect and the Skill Effect
  • 8.2 Normative and Evaluative Considerations: A Constitutive Component of Intentional Action, or Just a Bias?
  • 8.3 A Knobe Effect without Evaluative Considerations?
  • 8.4 The Multiple Meanings of "Intentionally"
  • 8.5 What Consequences for Action Theory?
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 9 Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility
  • 9.1 Introduction
  • 9.2 The Relevance of Experimental Studies of Responsibility Judgments
  • 9.3 An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions
  • 9.4 Manipulation
  • 9.5 Variantism and Invariantism
  • 9.6 Final Words
  • References
  • 10 Free Will and Experimental Philosophy
  • 10.1 Background
  • 10.2 Empirical Studies
  • 10.3 General Discussions
  • 10.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • B. Moral and Political Philosophy
  • 11 Solving the Trolley Problem
  • References
  • Pushing Moral Buttons
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Experiment 1a
  • 3 Experiment 1b
  • 4 Experiment 2a
  • 5 Experiment 2b
  • 6 Discussion
  • Acknowledgments
  • Appendix: Supplementary material
  • References
  • 12 The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck
  • 12.1 Introduction
  • 12.2 Intention versus Outcome in Moral Judgment
  • 12.3 Hindsight Bias
  • 12.4 Motivated Reasoning
  • 12.5 The Two-Process Model
  • 12.6 The Logic of Luck: A Pedagogical Hypothesis
  • 12.7 Testing Pedagogy: Control and Luck
  • 12.8 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 13 Metaethics
  • 13.1 Introduction
  • 13.2 Metaethics: Motivations and Methodology
  • 13.3 Moral Realism versus Anti-Realism
  • 13.4 Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism
  • 13.5 Moral Motivation
  • 13.6 Conclusion
  • References
  • 14 Aspects of Folk Moralitya
  • 14.1 Metaethics and Folk Morality
  • 14.2 The Case for Folk Objectivism
  • 14.3 The Case for Folk Relativism
  • 14.4 Empirical Work
  • 14.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 15 The Behavior of Ethicists
  • 15.1 Introduction
  • 15.2 Moral Behavior
  • 15.3 Relationships Between Moral Behavior and Moral Attitude
  • 15.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • 16 Experimental or Empirical Political Philosophy
  • 16.1 Existing Work and Philosophical Methodology
  • 16.2 Directions for Future Research
  • 16.3 Conclusion
  • References
  • 17 Ownership Rights
  • 17.1 Which Rights Does Ownership Confer?
  • 17.2 Specificity of Ownership Rights
  • 17.3 The Origins of Ownership
  • 17.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • C. Philosophy of Mind
  • 18 Attributions of Consciousness
  • 18.1 The Positive Case for a Lay Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness
  • 18.2 Alternative Explanations
  • 18.3 The Negative Case for a Lay Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness
  • 18.4 Alternative Explanations
  • 18.5 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 19 A Unified versus Componential View of Understanding Minds
  • 19.1 Introduction
  • 19.2 Unified View
  • 19.3 Componential View
  • 19.4 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 20 The Group Mind
  • 20.1 Do We Think about Group Minds?
  • 20.2 Explicit Judgments about Group Minds
  • 20.3 Cultural Differences in the Interpretation of Collective Behavior?
  • 20.4 Are Groups Entity-Like
  • 20.5 What Do the Existing Data Show?
  • References
  • 21 Synesthesia as a Challenge for Representationalism
  • 21.1 Introduction
  • 21.2 Synesthesia as a Perceptual State
  • 21.3 Synesthesia and Representationalism
  • 21.4 Qualia Fest?
  • References
  • 22 Naturalistic Approaches to Creativity
  • 22.1 A Brief Characterization of Creativity
  • 22.2 Skepticism about Explaining Creativity
  • 22.3 Empirical Philosophy (and Relevant Scientific Research)
  • 22.4 X-Phi: Philosophers in the Lab
  • 22.5 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • D. Epistemology
  • 23 Knowledge Judgments in "Gettier" Cases
  • 23.1 Thought-Experimenter Bias
  • 23.2 First Put Your Own House in Order
  • 23.3 Questionable Consensus
  • 23.4 Experimental Studies of Gettier Cases
  • 23.5 Other Applications
  • 23.6 Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 24 Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism
  • 24.1 Introduction
  • 24.2 Puzzling Deployment of Epistemic Notions
  • 24.3 Contextualism
  • 24.4 Interest Relative Invariantism
  • References
  • 25 Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions1
  • References
  • E. Philosophy of Language
  • 26 Reference
  • 26.1 Reference, Intuition, and Why It All Matters
  • 26.2 Experimental Philosophy of Reference: Beginnings
  • 26.3 Responses to Cross-Cultural Experimental Philosophy
  • 26.4 Kinds and Concepts
  • 26.5 Summing up: Lessons for the Study of Reference
  • References
  • 27 Experimental Pragmatics in Linguistics and Philosophy
  • 27.1 Sentence and Context
  • 27.2 Context in Primitive Propositions
  • 27.3 Conversational Inferences
  • 27.4 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 28 Generics and Experimental Philosophy
  • 28.1 What Makes a Generic True?
  • 28.2 The Cognitive Psychology of Generics
  • 28.3 The Generics-as-Defaults Hypothesis
  • 28.4 Generics and Social Cognition
  • 28.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • F. Metaphysics
  • 29 MetaphysicsExperience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science
  • 29.1 Moorean Facts and Manifest Evidence
  • 29.2 Case Study: Time and Temporal Experience
  • 29.3 Undercutting
  • 29.4 Related Approaches
  • 29.5 The Metaphysics Behind the Appearances
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 30 Experimental Philosophy and Causal Attribution
  • 30.1 Graphical Causal Models and Causal Attributions
  • 30.2 Actual Causation and Causal Structure
  • 30.3 Modeling the Default-Deviant Distinction
  • 30.4 Varieties of Norms and Their Influence
  • 30.5 Causal Attributions and the Desire to Blame
  • 30.6 Open Questions and Neglected Topics
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 31 Causal Models and Screening-Off
  • 31.1 Philosophical Debate on Screening Off
  • 31.2 Psychological Studies of the Screening-Off Rule
  • 31.3 Testing Screening-Off Using a Causally Sufficient Structure
  • 31.4 When Does Mechanistic Knowledge Mediate Causal Learning?
  • 31.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 32 Causal Search, Causal Modeling, and the Folk
  • 32.1 Understanding Folk Cognition
  • 32.2 Causal Models and Causal Search
  • 32.3 Causal Search and Modeling for Understanding the Folk
  • 32.4 Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • G. Philosophy of Science
  • 33 Experimental Philosophy of Science
  • 33.1 Surveying Scientists' Judgments
  • 33.2 A Defense of Experimental Conceptual Analysis
  • 33.3 Surveying Lay People's Judgments
  • 33.4 Bibliometrics and Cliometrics
  • 33.5 Ethnographic Methods in the Philosophy of Science
  • 33.6 Conclusion
  • References
  • 34 Explanation
  • 34.1 Introduction
  • 34.2 Folk and Scientific Conceptions of Explanation
  • 34.3 Defining Explanations Functionally
  • 34.4 Formal Measures of Explanatory Power
  • 34.5 Inference to the Best Explanation
  • 34.6 Explanation and Discovery
  • 34.7 Explanation and the Negative Program in Experimental Philosophy
  • 34.8 Toward an Experimental Philosophy of Explanation
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 35 The Concept of Innateness as an Object of Empirical Enquiry
  • 35.1 Introduction
  • 35.2 Folk Innateness Judgments: The Innateness Concept as a Manifestation of Our Folk Biology
  • 35.3 Does Empirical Research on the Three-Feature Hypothesis Bolster the Standard Criticism?
  • 35.4 More on Folk Innateness Judgments
  • 35.5 Innateness Judgments among Scientists
  • 35.6 Conclusion
  • References
  • H. Logic and Reasoning
  • 36 Experimental Philosophical Logic
  • 36.1 Logic, Pure and Applied
  • 36.2 Vagueness
  • 36.3 Other Cases
  • 36.4 Worries
  • 36.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 37 Experimental Philosophy Meets Formal Epistemology
  • 37.1 Experiments Informing Formal Epistemology
  • 37.2 Formal Epistemology Informing Experiments
  • 37.3 Other Topics and Further Reading
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 38 Experimental Approaches to the Study of Conditionals
  • 38.1 Studying Conditionals: Why a Change in Methodology May Be Called for
  • 38.2 Experimental Work on Conditionals
  • Acknowledgment
  • References
  • I. Metaphilosophy and Individual Differences
  • 39 Philosophical ExpertisePhilosophical Expertise
  • 39.1 The Expertise Defense
  • 39.2 A Folk Theory of Philosophical Expertise
  • 39.3 Empirical Work on Expert Philosophical Intuitions
  • 39.4 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 40 Intuitional Stability
  • References
  • 41 Personality and Philosophical Bias
  • 41.1 Individual Differences
  • 41.2 Personality Predicts Free Will Judgments
  • 41.3 Personality Predicts Intentional Action Judgments
  • 41.4 Personality Predicts Moral Judgments
  • 41.5 Implications of Predicable Philosophical Disagreement
  • References
  • 42 Experimental Philosophy and the Underrepresentation of Women
  • 42.1 Introduction
  • 42.2 Underrepresentation Data
  • 42.3 Why Study Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy?
  • 42.4 Potential Causes of Underrepresentation
  • 42.5 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Index
  • End User License Agreement

Dateiformat: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe-DRM (Digital Rights Management)

Systemvoraussetzungen:

Computer (Windows; MacOS X; Linux): Installieren Sie bereits vor dem Download die kostenlose Software Adobe Digital Editions (siehe E-Book Hilfe).

Tablet/Smartphone (Android; iOS): Installieren Sie bereits vor dem Download die kostenlose App Adobe Digital Editions (siehe E-Book Hilfe).

E-Book-Reader: Bookeen, Kobo, Pocketbook, Sony, Tolino u.v.a.m. (nicht Kindle)

Das Dateiformat PDF zeigt auf jeder Hardware eine Buchseite stets identisch an. Daher ist eine PDF auch für ein komplexes Layout geeignet, wie es bei Lehr- und Fachbüchern verwendet wird (Bilder, Tabellen, Spalten, Fußnoten). Bei kleinen Displays von E-Readern oder Smartphones sind PDF leider eher nervig, weil zu viel Scrollen notwendig ist. Mit Adobe-DRM wird hier ein "harter" Kopierschutz verwendet. Wenn die notwendigen Voraussetzungen nicht vorliegen, können Sie das E-Book leider nicht öffnen. Daher müssen Sie bereits vor dem Download Ihre Lese-Hardware vorbereiten.

Weitere Informationen finden Sie in unserer E-Book Hilfe.

Inhalt (PDF)

Download (sofort verfügbar)

129,99 €
inkl. 19% MwSt.
Download / Einzel-Lizenz
PDF mit Adobe DRM
siehe Systemvoraussetzungen
E-Book bestellen

Unsere Web-Seiten verwenden Cookies. Mit der Nutzung dieser Web-Seiten erklären Sie sich damit einverstanden. Mehr Informationen finden Sie in unserem Datenschutzhinweis. Ok