Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 16. Juli 2020
  • |
  • 320 Seiten
 
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978-0-19-260330-2 (ISBN)
 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
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  • Großbritannien
  • 1,84 MB
978-0-19-260330-2 (9780192603302)
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Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (OUP 2009).
  • Cover
  • Oxford Studies in Metaethics
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • Introduction
  • 1 Reason and Respect
  • 1.1. THE SOCIALITY OF REASON
  • 1.2. REASONING AS A COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY
  • 1.3. COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY AND RESPECT
  • We now have
  • References
  • 2 The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons: (Or: How Not to Be a Psychopath)
  • 2.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 2.2. DE RE ACCOUNTS OF IMPLICIT APPRECIATION
  • 2.3. DE DICTO ACCOUNTS OF IMPLICIT APPRECIATION
  • 2.3.1. A Discursive Account of Implicit Appreciation
  • 2.3.2. A Causal Tracking Account of Implicit Appreciation
  • 2.3.3. A Functional Role Account of Implicit Appreciation
  • 2.4. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF IMPLICIT APPRECIATION
  • 2.4.1. A Cognitive Phenomenology Account of Implicit Appreciation
  • 2.4.2. A Non-Discursive Experiential Representation?
  • 2.4.3. A Distinctive Moral Phenomenology?
  • 2.5. PHENOMENOLOGY AND ORDINARY MORAL REASONS-APPRECIATION
  • 2.5.1. Non-Cognitivists and the Attitude Specification Problem
  • 2.5.2. Cognitivism and Moral Motivation
  • 2.6. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 3 Who's on First?
  • 3.1. WHAT IS IT FOR SOMETHING TO BE "ON FIRST" ?
  • 3.2. IS SOMETHING "ON FIRST" ?
  • 3.2.1. The Goal
  • 3.2.2. The Argumentative Strategy
  • 3.2.3. The Sociological Observation
  • 3.3. WHAT IF NOTHING IS "ON FIRST" ?
  • 3.3.1. Two Kinds of Categories
  • 3.3.2. The Stark Alternative
  • 3.3.3. Why Accept Stark Alternative?
  • 3.3.4. Objections to Stark Alternative
  • 3.4. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 4 Excuse without Exculpation The Case of Moral Ignorance
  • 4.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 4.2. THE LIMITS OF OUR INTUITIONS ABOUT CASES
  • 4.3. AN UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTION ABOUT EXCUSES
  • 4.4. A DEFENSE OF BLAME-NEGATION?
  • 4.5. NORMATIVE FOOTPRINTS AND AMOUNTS OF BLAME
  • 4.6. EXCUSES AS BLAME-MITIGATORS
  • 4.7. THE CONTRASTIVE METHOD
  • 4.7.1. Against Harman
  • 4.7.2. Against Rosen
  • 4.8. MORAL VERSUS NONMORAL IGNORANCE
  • 4.8.1. How Far-Reaching is its Conclusion?
  • 4.8.2. What does the Argument tell us about Agents who act from profound Moral Ignorance?
  • 4.8.3. How does Moral Ignorance as an Excuse Compare to Nonmoral Ignorance?
  • References
  • 5 Resisting Reductive Realism
  • 5.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 5.2. STAGE SETTING
  • 5.2.1. Resistance to Reductivism, What
  • 5.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL, CONCEPT-BASED EXPLANATIONS
  • 5.3.1. Using Normative Concepts to Explain the Sense of Incredibility: Contextualism
  • 5.3.1.1. Contextualism Doesn't Explain the Sense of Incredibility
  • 5.3.2. Using Normative Concepts to Explain the Sense of Incredibility: Unanalyzability
  • 5.4. REFINING THE ACCOUNT
  • 5.4.1. Addressing Two Problems
  • 5.4.2. Why Supervenience Failures in Ethics are Hard to Conceive of
  • 5.4.3. Explaining the Sense of Incredibility in Full
  • 5.5. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 6 Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst
  • 6.1. PHILOSOPHICAL ANGST
  • 6.2. HOW TO BE ANGSTY ABOUT MORAL REALISM
  • 6.2.1. The Badness of Moral Nihilism
  • 6.2.2. The Badness of Anti-Realism
  • 6.2.3. The Inexpressible Badness of Quasi-Realism
  • 6.3. CONCLUSION
  • Reference
  • 7 Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
  • 7.1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METASEMANTIC OBJECTIONS TO NON-NATURALISM
  • 7.2. NON-NATURALISM AND TRADITIONALMETASE MANTICS
  • 7.2.1. Causal and Teleological Theories and Non-Naturalism
  • 7.2.2. Conceptual Role Semantics
  • 7.2.3. Neo-Descriptivism, Connectedness, and Non-Naturalism
  • 7.2.4. Neo-Descriptivism, Connectedness, and a General Lesson
  • 7.3. REFERENCE MAGNETS TO THE RESCUE?
  • 7.4. AN EPISTEMIC APPROACH TO METASEMANTICS
  • 7.5. HOW THE EPISTEMIC THEORY HELPS THE NON-NATURALIST
  • 7.5.1. Non-Naturalism and the Epistemic Theory of Content
  • 7.5.2. Metasemantic and Epistemic Objections to Non-Naturalism: One and the Same?
  • 7.5.3. Autonomy and the "Just Too Different" Intuition
  • 7.6. CONCLUSION
  • APPENDIX: Aboutness and Justification: Dickie's Arguments
  • References
  • 8 The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
  • 8.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 8.2. THE DATA
  • 8.3. EXPLAINING THE DATA
  • 8.4. MORAL PRINCIPLES ARE NOT MERELY EXPLANATORY IN CONTENT
  • 8.5. THE NOMIC VIEW OF MORAL EXPLANATIONS
  • 8.5.1. Berker's Objections
  • 8.6. MORAL PLATONISM
  • 8.6.1. Metaphysical Analysis
  • 8.7. NECESSITY
  • References
  • 9 Quasi-Dependence
  • 9.1. A LACUNA
  • 9.2. A PROPOSAL
  • 9.3. A PROBLEM
  • References
  • 10 Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism
  • 10.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 10.2. THREE THESES REGARDING MORAL REASONS
  • 10.3. GROUP AGENCY MEETS METAETHICS
  • 10.3.1. Expanding our Understanding of Agency
  • 10.3.2. The Proposal in More Detail
  • 10.3.3. The Payoff: Revisiting Claims (1)-(3)
  • 10.4. SELECTED QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
  • 10.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  • References
  • 11 Welfare and Rational Fit
  • 11.1. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF WELFARIST GOOD-FOR
  • 11.2. REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS
  • 11.2.1. The Private Ownership Account
  • 11.2.2. The Locative Account
  • 11.3. NON-REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS
  • 11.3.1. Object-Scope
  • 11.3.2. Wide versus Narrow Subject-Scope
  • 11.3.3. Normativity
  • 11.4. A RATIONAL FIT ACCOUNT OF GOOD-FOR
  • 11.5. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 12 Accommodation to Injustice
  • 12.1. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
  • 12.2. ATTENUATION
  • 12.3. TIME-SENSITIVE REASONS
  • 12.4. TIME-SENSITIVE BACKGROUND CONDITIONS
  • 12.5. ACCOMMODATION AS MERE CHANGE
  • 12.6. ABANDON REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS?
  • 12.7. THE UNREASONABLENESS OF ACCOMMODATION
  • 12.8. A LIMITATION OF INTELLIGIBILITY
  • 12.9. THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOMMODATION
  • 12.10. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 13 The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology
  • 13.1. THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE
  • 13.2. SKEPTICAL DILEMMAS AND EXPLANATORY DEFICITS
  • 13.2.1. Benacerraf's Challenge
  • 13.2.2. Field's Challenge
  • 13.3. EXPLAINING RELIABILITY
  • 13.3.1. External Conditions on Knowledge
  • 13.3.2. Reliability, Non-Accidentality, and Sets of Beliefs
  • 13.3.3. Non-Accidentality and MM-Reliability
  • 13.4. AN EXPLANATORY CONDITION
  • 13.4.1. The Case for EC
  • 13.4.2. EC and Future Knowledge
  • 13.4.3. EC and A Priori Knowledge
  • 13.5. CONCLUSION
  • References
  • 14 Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
  • 14.1. INTRODUCTION
  • 14.2. THE DEBUNKING ARGUMENT
  • 14.3. THE MINIMALIST GAMBIT
  • 14.4. BEGGING QUESTIONS AND DEFAULT ENTITLEMENT
  • 14.5. DEFEAT AND EPISTEMIC PRIORITY
  • 14.6. SENSITIVITY FIRST
  • 14.7. SAFETY FIRST
  • 14.8. NEVER MIND THE GAP
  • 14.9. UPSHOTS
  • References
  • Index

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