This book is a survey of key issues in the theory of evaluation aimed at exhibiting and clarifying the rational nature of the thought-procedures involved. By means of theoretical analysis and explanatory case studies, this volume shows how evaluation is-or should be-a rational procedure directed at appropriate objectives. Above all, it maintains the objectivity of rational evaluation.
Nicholas Rescher is Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at be University of Pittsburgh where he has also served as Chairman of the Philosophy Department and a Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science.
Part I: General Principles
Chapter 1: Value Basics
Chapter 2: Value Attribution
Chapter 3: Rational Choice and Value Complementarity
Chapter 4: Integration Problems
Chapter 5: Rationality Issues
Chapter 6: Rational Choice and Merit Complementarity
Chapter 7: Circularity Issues
Part II: Cognitive Evaluation
Chapter 8: Evaluating Cognitive Significance
Chapter 9: Epistemic Evaluation
Chapter 10: Allocating Scientific Credit
Chapter 11: Evaluating Contention Tenacity