Chinese Small Property

The Co-Evolution of Law and Social Norms
Cambridge University Press
  • erschienen am 27. September 2017
  • |
  • 230 Seiten
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-1-316-81489-5 (ISBN)
Small property houses provide living space to about eight million migrant workers, office space for start-ups, grassroots police stations and public schools; their contribution to the economic growth and urbanization of a city is immense. The interaction between the small property sector and the formal legal order has a long history and small property has become an established engine of social and legal change. Chinese Small Property presents vivid stories about how institutional entrepreneurs worked together to create an impersonal market outside of the formal legal system to support millions of transactions. Qiao uses an eleven-month fieldwork project in Shenzhen - China's first special economic zone that has grown to a mega city with over fifteen million people - to demonstrate this. A thorough and detailed investigation into small property rights in China, Chinese Small Property is an invaluable source of new information for students and scholars of the field.
  • Englisch
  • Cambridge
  • |
  • Großbritannien
Cambridge University Press
  • Für höhere Schule und Studium
Worked examples or Exercises; 10 Tables, black and white; 3 Maps; 9 Halftones, black and white; 2 Line drawings, black and white
  • 4,95 MB
978-1-316-81489-5 (9781316814895)
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Shitong Qiao is Assistant Professor of Law at The University of Hong Kong and New York University Global Associate Professor of Law. Qiao graduated from top Chinese and US law schools with numerous prizes, including the Top Academic Prize from Peking University and the Judge Ralph K. Winter Prize from Yale University, Connecticut. He advises government agencies, inside and outside China, on the Chinese land regime. His publications on property and social norms have appeared in leading English and Chinese law journals.
  • Cover
  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Table of contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • I.1 Introduction
  • I.1 A Market without Legal Titles?
  • I.2 The Market: A Bird's Eye View
  • I.2.1 Chinese Property Law Reform and Small Property Nationwide
  • I.2.2 Small-Property Market in Shenzhen
  • I.3 Piercing the Market: Structure of the Book
  • I.4 Property Law and Norms in Temporality
  • 1 The Evolution of Land Law in China: Partial Reform, Vested Interests, and Small Property
  • 1.1 Dual Land Ownership and Rural-Urban Land Conversion
  • 1.1.1 State Ownership of Urban Land
  • 1.1.2 Collective Ownership of Rural Land
  • 1.1.3 Structure of Chinese Local Government and Rural-Urban Land Conversion
  • 1.2 Urban Land Use Reform
  • 1.2.1 The Creation of Land Use Rights: From Shenzhen Experiment to Constitutional Amendment
  • 1.2.2 The Central-Local Distribution of Land Sales Revenue
  • 1.2.3 Regulating Local Governments' Land Use Power
  • 1.3 Rural Land Use Reform
  • 1.3.1 Rural Land Transfer Is Nothing New
  • 1.3.2 Rural Land Transfer Is Not Legalized
  • 1.3.3 The Incompatibility of Rural Land Use Reform with Urban Land Use Reform
  • 1.3.4 1998 LAL Revision: ''The Strictest Land Use Control System in the World''
  • 1.4 ''Weapons of the Weak:'' Increasing Illegality and Institutional Adaptation
  • 1.4.1 Township and Village Enterprises (''TVEs'')
  • 1.4.2 Agricultural Construction
  • 1.4.3 Policy Resistance and Adaptation
  • 2 Planting Houses in Shenzhen
  • 2.1 Development amid Legal Ambiguity
  • 2.2 A Network of Institutional Innovators
  • 2.2.1 Village Co-ops
  • 2.2.2 Land Developers
  • 2.2.3 Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank (SRCB)
  • 2.2.4 Real Estate Brokers
  • 2.2.5 Lawyers
  • 2.3 Development against Law
  • 2.3.1 Too ''Big'' to Fail
  • 2.3.2 Competing Government Interests
  • Competition between Different Levels of the Local Government
  • Competition between Different Agencies of the Local Government
  • 2.3.3 An Expanded Network
  • 2.4 Conclusion
  • 3 Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation
  • 3.1 Focal Point
  • 3.1.1 Theory
  • 3.1.2 Focal Point in Shenzhen
  • 3.2 Coordination Games and the Market
  • 3.2.1 An Assurance Game of Market Formation
  • An Assurance Game of Social Entrepreneurs
  • Application to the Shenzhen Case
  • 3.2.2 Two Hawk-Dove Games of Market Operation
  • A Hawk-Dove Game of the Demolition Risk
  • A Hawk-Dove Game of the Contract Risk
  • The Legal Magic
  • Contract of Cooperative House-Construction
  • Village Co-Op Seal, Lawyer Testimony, Private Real Estate Certificate, etc.
  • The Game
  • The Cost of Hawk-Hawk
  • The Focal Point and the Choice of the Equilibrium
  • 3.3 Conclusion
  • 4 Small Property, Adverse Possession, and Optional Law
  • 4.1 Framing the Question: Adverse Possession in Ayres' Cathedral
  • 4.1.1 The Concept: From Possession of Things to Possession of Rights
  • 4.1.2 Property Rule, Liability Rule and Adverse Possession
  • 4.1.3 The Best-Chooser Principle
  • 4.2 Structuring Legal Entitlements for Small Property
  • 4.2.1 Rule 1
  • 4.2.2 Rule 3
  • 4.2.3 Rule 6
  • 4.2.4 Rule 2
  • 4.2.5 Rule 4
  • 4.2.6 Rule 5
  • 4.3 An Optional Law Approach to Informal Property Rights
  • 5 Small Property in Transition: A Tale of Two Villages
  • 5.1 Two Destinies of Small Property
  • 5.1.1 W village: The Mafia-Style Small-Property Business
  • Brother Dragon and His Xinyian
  • Criminal Prosecution, the Fall of W village, and A Crisis of the Market
  • 5.1.2 Z village: In the Name of Law
  • 5.2 Searching for an Explanation
  • 5.2.1 Layering and Fragmentation of Law
  • 5.2.2 The Challenge to Law and Social Norms
  • 5.2.3 Multiple-Network Evolution
  • 5.3 Village Leaders' Three Identities and an Integrated Explanation
  • 5.3.1 Investment Failure, Village Crisis, and Mafianization of W village
  • 5.3.2 Increasing Dividends, Governing Capacity, and Legalization of Z village
  • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6 All Quiet on the Judicial Front?
  • 6.1 Judicial Minimalism in Shenzhen
  • 6.1.1 Illegal Property, Valid Possession
  • 6.1.2 Contracts
  • Confirming Illegality without Adjudicating the Consequences
  • Deferring to Governmental Policy
  • 6.2 Judicial Entrepreneurialism in Beijing
  • 6.2.1 Beijing High Court: Mediating between Upholding the Law and Resolving Social Problems
  • 6.2.2 The Artists' Village Case: Ma v. Li
  • 6.3 Supreme People's Court and High Courts Nationwide
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • Conclusion
  • C.1 Conclusion: Market Transition: Sticky Norms or Sticky Law?
  • C.1 The Residual Legal Centralism in Law and Social Norms
  • C.2 Property Norms Are More Responsive to Social Change Than Property Law
  • C.3 Reconstitution of Law and Social Norms
  • C.4 De Soto Revisited
  • Appendix 1 Research Methods
  • Appendix 2 Pictures of Small-Property Constructions in Shenzhen
  • References
  • English
  • Chinese
  • Index
'Can a vibrant real estate market arise in a nation with a stunted legal system? Hernando de Soto famously thought not. Splendidly interweaving field findings with social-scientific theory, Shitong Qiao dismantles the de Soto thesis. In many Chinese cities, booming housing markets have rested largely on informal understandings.' Robert Ellickson, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School 'In this remarkable book, Shitong Qiao not only illustrates the intricacies of China's booming periurban land market but also demonstrates how Chinese peasants, together with newly urbanizing industrial workers, have fashioned extensive systems of informal 'small property' commercial land transactions, in spite of a legal system that purportedly forbids them. Qiao's book offers a nuanced discussion of the relationships between law and social norms in Chinese land markets, along with a significant rejoinder to the view that dynamic land markets depend on formal systems of property law.' Carol M. Rose, University of Arizona 'A fascinating exploration of the lively housing market that arose in suburban Shenzhen outside the framework of formal law. Based on in-depth field research, Qiao documents the residential building boom, and he then assesses both the strengths and the ultimate limitations of extra-legal arrangements as engines of development.' Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale University, Connecticut 'In this multi-disciplinary work, Qiao has taken Robert Ellickson's pioneering work on social norms and property rights from rural California to Shenzhen, China, one of the world's fastest growing, most complex urban markets. In doing so he has demonstrated that much of what we thought we knew about law, property rights, social norms, and development was incomplete at best and flat wrong at worst.' Frank Upham, Wilf Family Professor of Property Law, New York University School of Law 'All in all, this book provides very valuable insights into the evolution of China's property rights regime. It revisits several influential conventional theories and offers critical and valid scrutiny based on empirical findings in China. These insights are most likely applicable to other primitive property markets in developing countries too. The author advances the theoretical depth of existing literature and offers an analytical framework for further research worth doing by scholars of varying fields, including property law, comparative law, law and development, and law and economics.' Weitseng Chen, ICON

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