A Variety of Causes

 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 3. September 2020
  • |
  • 576 Seiten
 
E-Book | ePUB mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-0-19-260286-2 (ISBN)
 
This is the first book length defence of a counterfactual theory of causation. The analysis defended is new. It expresses the idea that, independent of its competitors, a cause raises the chance of an effect over its mean background chance by a complete causal chain. The analysis depends upon a novel development of David Lewis's Theory of Counterfactuals. One consequence of the analysis is that causation is not transitive. Causation is also nonsymmetric. The counterfactual basis of causal nonsymmetry is the result of a number of different, and sometimes interacting, nonsymmetries. The analysis allows for the development of a novel theory of events whose nature is independent of their role in causation and the identification of one other important causal relationship: property causation. Although compatible with Hume's denial of necessary connections between distinct existences, a key feature of the theory is that it benefits from being independent of the Humean framework. There are two ways in which something may be metaphysically fundamental: vertically and horizontally. Many metaphysicians emphasise vertical fundamentality and focus on truth making. The book rejects this emphasis and the truth making approach in particular. Horizontally fundamental metaphysical entities are those that are necessary components in different possible universes. Causation has a claim to be horizontally fundamental: the cement of any universe. Laws are patterns of causation realised in different metaphysical frameworks such as those articulated by Lewis, Armstrong and the powers ontologists. The book recognises varieties of causation both in, for example, counting cases of double prevention and causation by genuine processes as types of causation, and allowing that the analysis identifies causes across these different metaphysical frameworks.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 2,37 MB
978-0-19-260286-2 (9780192602862)
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Paul Noordhof is Anniversary Professor of Philosophy at the University of York, having previously been a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. He was an Associate Editor of Mind from 1991-2015, and its Reviews Editor from 2000-2015. He has published in Analysis, British Journal for the Philosophy Science, Mind, Mind and Language, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research on topics in belief, causation, emergence, imagination, perceptual content and self-deception. He had a Research Fellowship at Clare Hall, Cambridge from 1992-1994, and a Major Leverhulme Research Fellowship from 2006-2009. He has co-edited books on Causation and Art and Belief for Routledge and OUP.
  • Cover
  • A Variety of Causes
  • Copyright
  • Preface and Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • 1: The Analysis of Causation
  • 1.1 From Regularities to Counterfactuals
  • 1.2 Counterfactuals and Dependency
  • 1.2.1 The sufficient condition and the possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals
  • 1.2.2 Causal necessity and sufficiency
  • 1.2.3 Indeterministic causation: preliminary characterization
  • 1.2.4 Counterfactual versus conditional chance-raising
  • 1.2.5 Causal necessity and sufficiency and the tie between events
  • 1.3 Types of Counterfactual Theory
  • 1.4 Causation as a Natural Relation and the Nature of Analysis
  • 1.5 Alternative Accounts of Causation and the Discussion Ahead
  • 2: Humean Supervenience and the Possibility of Necessitation
  • 2.1 Humean Supervenience and the Denial of Necessary Connections
  • 2.2 Experiences of Causation and Necessary Connection
  • 2.3 The Concept of Necessary Connection
  • 2.4 Distinct Existence
  • 2.4.1 Modal characterization of distinct existence
  • 2.4.2 Spatial characterization of distinct existence
  • 2.4.3 The distinct arrangement characterization of distinct existence and distinct existence pluralism
  • 2.5 Concluding Remarks
  • 3: Counterfactuals and Closeness
  • 3.1 Lewis' Similarity Weighting and the Status of the Perfect Match Condition
  • 3.2 The Future Similarity Objection under Indeterminism
  • 3.3 Antecedent-Relative Potential Chance-Raising
  • 3.4 The Approximate Match Condition and the Appeal to Causal Independence
  • 3.5 Match and the Causal Circumstances of the Antecedent: Issues with the Transition Period
  • 3.5.1 Backtracking and the threat of circularity
  • 3.5.2 A tendency to lateness?
  • 3.5.3 Miracles against match
  • 3.5.4 Similarity of causal circumstances
  • 3.5.5 Closing remarks
  • 3.6 A General Defence of the Approach
  • 4: A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation
  • 4.1 Indeterministic Causation and Pre-emption: A Devastating Combination
  • 4.2 Completed Causal Processes
  • 4.2.1 Towards an alternative analysis of completeness
  • 4.2.2 Problems with the 'absent event' account of incompleteness
  • 4.2.3 Indeterminism, chance-raising, and the 'actual events' account of completeness
  • 4.2.4 Refinement of the 'actual events' clause
  • 4.2.5 Late pre-emption and the 'actual events' clause
  • 4.2.6 Hasteners, delayers, and probabilistic dependence
  • 4.2.7 Completeness at the right time
  • 4.2.8 Competing signs of incompleteness
  • 4.2.9 Absence of probabilities or probability raising
  • 4.2.10 Causing effects and causing effects in certain time periods
  • 4.2.11 Actually completing in time: catalysts and anti-catalysts
  • 4.3 S-Dependencies and the Context-Determined Contrastive Character of Causation
  • 4.4 Concluding Remarks
  • 5: The Non-Transitivity of Causation
  • 5.1 The Problem Cases
  • 5.2 The Distinct Property Instances Strategy
  • 5.2.1 Property instances
  • 5.2.2 Efficacy implication
  • 5.3 Undermining the Intuitions
  • 5.4 Non-Transitive Analyses
  • 5.4.1 Probabilistic P-dependence
  • 5.4.2 Fixing accounts
  • 5.4.2.1 Hitchcock's approach
  • 5.4.2.2 Yablo's approach
  • 5.4.3 Sartorio's constraints on causation
  • 5.5 Concluding Remarks
  • 6: Causal Circumstances
  • 6.1 Causal Circumstances and the Status of Total Causes
  • 6.2 Challenges to Egalitarianism
  • 6.2.1 Cause as context-sensitive explanatory factor
  • 6.2.2 Triggering versus enabling or pre-disposing conditions
  • 6.2.3 Causes as contra-normal conditions
  • 6.3 Concluding Remarks
  • 7: The Ontological Categories of Causes
  • 7.1 Continuants as Triggers?
  • 7.2 Truth-Makers and Non-Truth-Makers
  • 7.2.1 Facts, events, and property instances: narrowing down the options
  • 7.2.2 Truth-maker necessitation
  • 7.2.3 Disjunctive causes: the return of facts?
  • 7.3 Towards a Theory of Events
  • 7.3.1 Causation and the essential properties of events
  • 7.3.2 An intermediate approach to event individuation
  • 7.3.3 Emphasis and the relata of causation
  • 7.4 Concluding Remarks
  • 8: Negative Causation and the Relationality of Causation
  • 8.1 Causation as Mutual Manifestation of Reciprocal Disposition Partners
  • 8.2 Truth-Making and Negative Existential Propositions: Options and Alternatives
  • 8.3 Negative Causation
  • 8.3.1 Dependency on the corresponding positive events
  • 8.3.2 Dependency on positive causal surrogates
  • 8.4 Concluding Remarks
  • 9: Property Causation
  • 9.1 Property Instance Causation
  • 9.1.1 Minimal metaphysical necessitation relations between property instances
  • 9.1.2 The challenge from vertical necessitation relations
  • 9.2 Avoidance and Head-On Strategies
  • 9.2.1 Avoidance strategies
  • 9.2.2 Head-on strategies
  • 9.2.2.1 Particularity, Characteriztion, and Defence
  • 9.2.2.2 Casual completeness of physics and overdetermination
  • 9.3 Property Causation Not Property Instance Causation
  • 9.4 Contrastive Causation and Explanatory Virtues
  • 9.5 Concluding Remarks
  • 10: Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Intrinsicality
  • 10.1 Distinct Existence and Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence
  • 10.2 Non-Causal Counterfactuals and the Similarity Weighting
  • 10.3 Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Causation
  • 10.4 Causal Properties
  • 10.5 Intrinsicality
  • 10.6 Concluding Remarks
  • 11: Processes and Prevention
  • 11.1 Process Theories
  • 11.1.1 Types and motivation
  • 11.1.2 Mark transmission theory
  • 11.1.3 Transference theories
  • 11.1.4 Conserved quantity theories
  • 11.1.5 Moral
  • 11.2 The Intuitive Difference, Action at a Distance, and Intrinsicality
  • 11.2.1 The cases and the intuition of difference
  • 11.2.2 Causes as producers and the disjunctive account of responsibility
  • 11.2.3 Locality and intrinsicality
  • 11.2.3.1 Locality
  • 11.2.3.2 Intrinsicality
  • 11.3 Bell Inequality and Relativity: The Options
  • 11.4 Concluding Remarks
  • 12: Causal Non-Symmetry
  • 12.1 Causal Non-Symmetry Rather Than Asymmetry
  • 12.2 Counterfactual Theories of Causal Non-Symmetry
  • 12.3 Macro-Non-Symmetries
  • 12.3.1 Asymmetry of overdetermination
  • 12.3.2 Independence condition and the transition period
  • 12.4 A Case for Primitive Non-Symmetric Chance-Raising?
  • 12.4.1 Local asymmetry reversal
  • 12.4.2 Simple cases
  • 12.4.3 Tooley's inverse universes
  • 12.5 Concluding Remarks
  • 13: Agency, Intervention, and the Past
  • 13.1 The Role of Agency
  • 13.1.1 Evidential decision theory and causal decision theory
  • 13.1.2 Evidential decision theory and the need for causal information
  • 13.1.3 Causal decision theory, ratification, and instability
  • 13.1.4 Causal non-symmetry and agency
  • 13.2 Agency-Motivated Account of Unity and Intervention
  • 13.3 Causes Usually Precede Their Effects
  • 13.3.1 Causal theory of temporal precedence
  • 13.3.2 Time direction as preponderant causal direction: causal perspectivalism and past perspectivalism
  • 13.4 Concluding Remarks
  • 14: Causation and Laws
  • 14.1 Brute Singular Causation
  • 14.2 Law-Based Accounts of Causation
  • 14.3 Three Accounts of Laws
  • 14.3.1 Regularity theory: the best system analysis
  • 14.3.2 Independent necessitation accounts
  • 14.3.3 Dependent necessitation accounts: the powers ontology
  • 14.3.4 Intrinsicality, generality, and induction
  • 14.3.5 Counterfactual support
  • 14.3.6 Quidditism
  • 14.4 Laws as Variably Realized: Structuralism about Laws
  • 14.5 Concluding Remarks
  • 15: The Ontology of Chance
  • 15.1 Undermining and Contradiction
  • 15.2 Propensity Theories of Chance
  • 15.3 Concluding Remarks
  • 16: Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds
  • 16.1 Varieties of Humean Supervenience and the Reduction of Modality
  • 16.2 Other Possible Concrete Worlds and Humeanism
  • 16.3 Can Humeans Afford to Allow That the Denial of Necessary Connections Is Contingent?
  • 16.3.1 Do intra-world necessities vitiate the analysis of necessity in terms of possible worlds?
  • 16.3.2 Principle of recombination
  • 16.4 Wilson's Argument against the Distinct Existences Principle
  • 16.5 Physicalism and Humeanism
  • 16.6 Varieties of Causation: Concluding Picture and Implications for Methodology of Metaphysics
  • 16.7 Concluding Remarks
  • Bibliography
  • Index
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