Language, World, and Limits

Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics
 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 28. Juni 2019
  • |
  • 320 Seiten
 
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978-0-19-255677-6 (ISBN)
 
These essays by A.W. Moore are all concerned with the business of representing how things are - its nature, its scope, and its limits. The essays in Part One deal with linguistic representation and discuss topics such as rules of representation and their nature, the sorites paradox, and the very distinction between sense and nonsense. Wittgenstein's work, both early and late, figures prominently. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that some things are beyond representation. The essays in Part Two deal with representation more generally and with the character of what is represented, and owe much to Bernard Williams's argument for the possibility of representation from no point of view. They touch more or less directly on the distinction between representation from a point of view and representation from no point of view-in some cases by exploring various consequences of Kant's belief that representation of how things are physically is always, eo ipso, representation from a point of view. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that nothing is beyond representation. Each of the essays in Part Three, which draw inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how the resulting tension between Parts One and Two is to be resolved: namely, by construing the first part as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second part as a thesis about facts or truths.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 0,63 MB
978-0-19-255677-6 (9780192556776)
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A.W. Moore is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St Hugh's College, Oxford, where he is also Vice-Principal. He studied Philosophy as an undergraduate in Cambridge and did postgraduate work in Oxford, where he obtained his doctorate under the supervision of Michael Dummett. He has held teaching and research positions at University College, Oxford, and King's College, Cambridge, and is one of Bernard Williams' literary executors. He is joint editor, with Lucy O'Brien, of the journal Mind. In 2016 he wrote and presented the series A History of the Infinite on BBC Radio 4.
  • Intro
  • Language, World, and Limits: Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Publisher's Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • 1. Part I: Language
  • 2. Part II:The World and Our Representations of it
  • 3. Part III: Ineffability
  • PART I. Language
  • 1. How Significant is the Use/Mention Distinction?
  • Abstract
  • 1. The distinction introduced
  • 2. The impossibility of the distinction's both being clear-cut and having the significance that it is usually thought to have
  • 3. Repercussions
  • 2. The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
  • Abstract
  • 1. The two distinctions
  • 1.1 The underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction
  • 1.2 The analytic/synthetic distinction
  • 1.3 Options for what to say if accepting the former distinction entails accepting the latter
  • 2. Tension between Quine's two doctrines concerning these distinctions
  • 3. Incompatibility between Quine's two doctrines concerning these distinctions
  • Appendix
  • 3. What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?
  • Abstract
  • 1. Stating rules of representation
  • 2. Representing things categorically
  • 3. Mentioning expressions
  • 4. Saying truly or falsely how things are
  • 5. Saying vaguely how things are
  • 6. Stating rules of rules of representation
  • 4. The Bounds of Nonsense
  • Abstract
  • Appendix
  • 5. Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning
  • Abstract
  • 1. Transcendental idealism and the predicament that is inherent in it
  • 2. Wittgenstein's later work and its preclusion of a philosophically substantial theory of meaning
  • 3. The idea that meaning is a matter of how we carry on
  • 4. How a philosophically substantial theory of meaning would expose the predicament inherent in Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism
  • Postscript for the reprint
  • 6. The Bounds of Sense
  • Abstract
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Tractatus
  • 3. Kant
  • 4. Logical positivism
  • 5. Quine
  • 6. Conclusion
  • PART II. The World and Our Representations of it
  • 7. A Note on Kant's First Antinomy
  • Abstract
  • 8. Bird on Kant's Mathematical Antinomies
  • Abstract
  • 9. Solipsism and Subjectivity
  • Abstract
  • 1. Solipsism and its formulation
  • 2. The Putnam objection to (S)
  • 3. The natural counter-objection
  • 4. The Putnam reply
  • 5. The reinforced counter-objection
  • 6. Whither solipsism?
  • 10. One or Two Dogmas of Objectivism
  • Abstract
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Six things that may happen when we reLect critically on our beliefs
  • 3. Nagel's fundamental idea and two difficulties that he faces
  • 4. One way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty
  • 5. A second way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty
  • 6. A third way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty, and his way of facing the second
  • 11. Apperception and the Unreality of Tense
  • Abstract
  • 1. Eight issues that could not reasonably be what is meant by the issue whether tense is real
  • 2. One issue that could reasonably be what is meant by the issue whether tense is real
  • 3. Why it is an open question whether tense is real on this construal
  • 4. A failed argument that tense is unreal on this construal, based on Kant's deduction of the categories
  • 5. Why there is no arguing that tense is unreal on this construal
  • 12. The Metaphysics of Perspective: Tense and Colour
  • Abstract
  • 1. One way of successfully undertaking the philosophical quest for reality
  • 2. Two categories of reservation about (A)
  • 3. Two preliminary observations
  • 4. Six reservations about (A) and their rebuttal
  • 13. Realism and the Absolute Conception
  • Abstract
  • 1. Realism, science, and ethics
  • 2. The absolute conception
  • 3. What the argument for the possibility of the absolute conception requires
  • 4. Realism and its variants
  • 14. One World
  • Abstract
  • PART III. Ineffability
  • 15. Being, Univocity, and Logical Syntax
  • Abstract
  • 1. The univocity of being
  • 2. How to think the univocity of being in logico-syntactic terms
  • 16. Ineffability and Religion
  • Abstract
  • 1. The Equestion whether there are any ineffable truths: its clarification and one simple argument for answering it negatively
  • 2. An outline of another argument for answering the question negatively
  • 3. Ineffable states of knowledge, and reasons for believing in them
  • 4. The attempt to put some of these ineffable states of knowledge into words
  • 5. Three areas of overlap between the language that results from such attempts and religious language
  • 17. On Saying and Showing
  • Abstract
  • 1. The saying/showing distinction in the Tractatus. Two examples
  • 2. Some preliminaries
  • 3. Basic justification for drawing such a distinction
  • 4. A third example. The Tractatus reconsidered. Its ethical and mystical aspects
  • 5. Unity in the Tractarian distinction
  • 6. Relativization in the concept of showing
  • 7. Understanding
  • 8. The later work of Wittgenstein
  • 8.1 Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy. Its resemblance to that of the Tractatus
  • 8.2 Inducement in the later work to say what we are shown
  • 18. Ineffability and Nonsense
  • Abstract
  • 1. Lewis' argument that there are inexpressible truths
  • 2. Standards of expressibility. Expression and ineffability defined
  • 3. The equestion whether there are any ineffable truths
  • 4. The equestion whether there is anything at all that is (non-trivially) ineffable
  • 5. Ineffable understanding and a reappraisal of the dispute between advocates of the traditional reading of the Tractatus and advocates of the new reading of it
  • 6. An objection to the idea of ineffable understanding. The objection deflected
  • 7. The understanding afforded by the Tractatus
  • 8. Nonsense as the vehicle for affording such understanding
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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