Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field.
The themes covered in the third volume are mind and science, sensory experience, and the philosophy of mind of Margaret Cavendish and C.A. Strong. It also contains a book symposium on David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.
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978-0-19-887947-3 (9780198879473)
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Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).
- Cover
- Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- List of Contributors
- PART I. MIND AND SCIENCE
- 1. The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
- Introduction
- 1. Approximate Rationality: What and Why
- 2. Two Competing Approximate Rationality Models
- 2.1 The Structural Model
- 2.2 The Dispositional Model
- 3. The Individuation Problem
- 3.1 Drawing on the Purely Normative
- 3.2 Drawing on Descriptive Data
- 3.3 Drawing on Theoretical Virtues
- 4. Generalizing the Problem
- 5. Conclusion
- References
- 2. The Average Isn't Normal: The History and Cognitive Science of an Everyday Scientific Practice
- 1. Two Approaches to the Study of Values in Science
- 1.1 The Direct Approach
- 1.2 The Indirect Approach
- 2. The Average and Normal
- 2.1 Normality in Cognitive Science
- 2.2 Normality in the History of Science
- 2.3 Summary and Interim Conclusion
- 3. Explaining Use of the Statistical Average
- 3.1 Diachronic: How the Average Took Over
- 3.2 Synchronic: How the Average Is Enforced
- 4. Conclusion
- References
- 3. Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally Driven Classificatory Schemes
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Representation as Correspondence
- 3. Representation without Correspondence?
- 4. Possible Responses
- 5. Conclusion
- References
- 4. Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias: Parallel Debates about Unconscious Content
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Consciousness and Content
- 3. Is Unconscious Perception Unconscious Content?
- 3.1 What Is Perception?
- 3.2 What Is Unconscious Perception?
- 3.3 Is Perception Really Unconscious?
- 3.4 Is Unconscious Perception Really Attributable Content?
- 3.5 Summary of Insights
- 4. Is Unconscious Bias Unconscious Bias?
- 4.1 What Is Bias?
- 4.2 What Is Unconscious Bias?
- 4.3 Is Unconscious Bias Really Unconscious?
- 4.4 Is Unconscious Bias Really Attributable Content?
- 5. Conclusion
- References
- 5. Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
- 1. The Sensory Constraint on Conscious Thought
- 2. Aphantasic Thoughts Do Not Have a Sensory Reduction Base
- 3. Aphantasic Thoughts Are Phenomenally Conscious
- 4. Conclusion
- References
- 6. The Introspective Method
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Is Introspection Reliable?
- 3. Wundt and Müller on Introspective Methods
- 3.1 The Method of Systematic Introspection
- 3.2 Müller and the Methods of Direct Introspection and Careful Retrospection
- 3.2.1 Müller's Critique of Systematic Introspection
- 3.2.2 The Methods of Restricted Inner Apprehension and Careful Retrospection
- 3.3 Wundt and the Method of Controlled Inner Apprehension
- 3.3.1 Wundt's Critique of Systematic Introspection
- 3.3.2 The Method of Controlled Inner Apprehension
- 3.4 The Complexity of Introspective Methods
- 4. Introspective Measures of Consciousness
- References
- PART II. SENSORY EXPERIENCE: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
- 7. Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness
- 1. Setting the Scene
- 2. Nozick's 'Experience Machine'
- 3. The Intrinsic Value of Perceptual Contact
- 4. Openness
- 5. The Eudaimonic Value of Openness
- 6. Availability, Belonging, and Accepting Contingency
- 7. On Shutting the World Out
- 8. Taking Stock
- 9. Direct Realism vs. Representationalism, Again
- 10. Conclusion
- References
- 8. Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement
- 1. The Puzzle of Perspectival Displacement
- 2. Language and Mind
- 3. Vendler and Peacocke
- 4. Camp
- 5. Three Observations
- 6. Our Proposal
- 7. Comparisons
- 8. Application 1: Fiction
- 9. Application 2: Desire
- References
- 9. The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Preliminaries
- 3. Unenriched Attraction
- 4. Enriched Attraction
- 5. Escaping the Dilemma?
- References
- 10. Seeing through Transparency
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Standard Understanding of Transparency
- 2.1 Harman's and Tye's Transparency Thesis
- 2.2 The Argument from Transparency
- 2.3 Revising Transparency
- 3. Distinctions and Transparency Theses
- 3.1 Strong vs. Weak Transparency
- 3.2 Metaphysical vs. Phenomenological Transparency
- 3.3 S-Transparency vs. Transparency Datum
- 4. Logical Relations across Distinctions
- 4.1 Phenomenological Transparency and Ultra-Strong Transparency
- 4.2 Phenomenological Transparency and Strong Transparency
- 4.3 Phenomenological Transparency and Weak Transparency
- 4.4 Upshot
- 5. A Unitary Multidimensional Logical Space
- 5.1 Four Dimensions
- 5.2 Mapping the Views on Visual Transparency
- 6. Scope
- 6.1 A Fifth Dimension
- 6.2 Relevance of Scope
- 6.2.1 Pervasiveness and Significance of Transparency
- 6.2.2 Transparency as a Guide to Differences between Experiences
- 6.2.3 Cross-Modal Phenomenological Differences and the Core of Transparency
- 7. Conclusion
- References
- PART III. BOOK SYMPOSIUM ON DAVID PAPINEAU'S THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE
- 11. Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
- Chapter 1
- Chapter 2
- Chapter 3
- Chapter 4
- References
- 12. Papineau on Sensory Experience
- 1. Consciousness and Awareness of Properties
- 2. Transparency
- 3. Colour Similarity
- References
- 13. Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
- 1. Book Summary
- 2. Two Notions of Representation
- 3. Papineau's Disagreement with Phenomenal Intentionalism
- 4. Quasi-Items as Intentional Contents
- 5. Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?
- 6. Introspection
- 7. Conclusion
- References
- 14. An Argument against Papineau's Qualitative View of Sensory Experience
- 1. The Spatial Character of Visual Experience
- 2. The Spatial Argument against the Qualitative View
- 3. Papineau's Reason for Rejecting the Spatial Claim?
- 4. Another Potential Reason to Reject the Spatial Claim?
- 5. Conclusion
- References
- 15. Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz, and Byrne
- 1. Mendelovici
- 2. Pautz
- 3. Byrne
- PART IV. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: Cavendish and Strong
- 16. Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self
- 1. Strawson on Mind and Matter
- 2. Cavendish on Mind and Matter
- 3. Cavendish vs. Strawson on the Self
- References
- 17. 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism)
- Introduction
- 1. Matter, Materialism, Monism
- 2. Animal Perception and Knowledge
- 2.1 Animal Perception
- 2.2 Animal Knowledge
- 3. Anti-Anthropomorphism
- 4. Perception and Knowledge
- 4.1 Creaturely Perception
- 4.2 Matter's Perception
- 4.3 Creaturely (Self-)Knowledge
- 4.4 Matter's Self-Knowledge
- 5. Sense and Reason
- 5.1 Self-Motion,Sense, and Reason
- 5.2 Order
- 5.3 'Rational Matter Is Really Weird'
- 6. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Works by Cavendish
- Secondary Literature
- 18. C. A. Strong-Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Terminology
- 3. Villa le Balze
- 4. Materialism: '?'
- 5. The Reality of Consciousness: '?'
- 6. Montague v Strong
- 7. Evolutionary Naturalism
- 8. Panpsychism, Archepsychism
- 9. Strong's panpsychism
- 10. Panpsychism and Power
- 11. Complexity and Simplification
- 12. R. W. Sellars
- 13. Conclusion
- References
- Index
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