Morality and Epistemic Judgement

The Argument From Analogy
 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 23. Oktober 2019
  • |
  • 160 Seiten
 
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-0-19-258042-9 (ISBN)
 
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 1,29 MB
978-0-19-258042-9 (9780192580429)
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Christopher Cowie obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2014. He subsequently worked as a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Cowie is currently Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham.
  • Cover
  • Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • PART I: THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
  • 1: Moral Error Theory
  • 1.1 Preliminaries
  • 1.2 The Internalism-Based Argument: Commitment Premise
  • 1.3 The Internalism-Based Argument: Existential Premise
  • 1.4 The Irreducibility-Based Argument: Commitment Premise
  • From Horgan and Timmons to Streumer
  • 1.5 The Irreducibility-Based Argument: Existential Premise
  • 1.6 Contrasting the Arguments
  • 1.7 Conclusion
  • 2: The Analogy
  • 2.1 Preliminaries
  • Two versions of argument from analogy
  • Epistemic judgement
  • Full belief and credence
  • 2.2 The Parity Premise: Internalism-Based
  • 2.3 The Parity Premise: Irreducibility-Based
  • 2.4 Das, Finlay, and Parity
  • 2.5 The Epistemic Existence Premise
  • 2.6 Roadmap and Strategic Omissions
  • A strategic omission
  • 2.7 Conclusion
  • PART II: AGAINST THE ANALOGY
  • 3: Against Internalism-Parity
  • 3.1 Internalism-Parity and the Basic Rationale
  • 3.2 Ordinary Explanation and Trivial Truths
  • First argument: Ordinary explanation
  • Second argument: Trivial truths
  • Putting the pieces together
  • 3.3 Ordinary Explanation and Trivial Truths in Morality
  • Morality and ordinary explanation
  • Morality and trivial truths
  • 3.4 Considered Propositions and Negative Reasons
  • First objection: Considered propositions
  • Second objection: Reasons not to believe
  • 3.5 The Conventionalism Criticism
  • 3.6 Work for Epistemic Institutionalists
  • 3.7 Conclusion
  • 4: Against Internalism-Parity: A Supplementary Argument
  • 4.1 The Structure of the Argument
  • 4.2 Action-Explanation Arguments
  • 4.3 The Upshot and Several Objections
  • 4.4 Less Clear-Cut Cases
  • The reasoning-first argument
  • The paradigmatic-ascription argument
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • 5: Against Irreducibility-Parity
  • 5.1 Irreducibility-Parity and the Basic Rationale
  • 5.2 Streumer on Irreducibility-Parity
  • 5.3 Heathwood on Parity
  • 5.4 The Surrogate Strategy
  • 5.5 Conclusion
  • PART III: ELABORATION
  • 6: The Conventionalism Criticism
  • 6.1 An Attitudinal Disanalogy
  • 6.2 The Belief-Based Rationale
  • 6.3 The Intentional Interpretation
  • 6.4 The Evolutionary Interpretation
  • 6.5 The Concept of Belief
  • 6.6 Conclusion
  • 7: Simple Veritism
  • 7.1 Criticisms of Simple Veritism
  • Trivial truths
  • Swamping
  • Higher epistemic goals
  • 7.2 Defending Veritism
  • 7.3 Knowledge as the Epistemic Aim
  • Constitution
  • Entailment
  • 7.4 The Anti-Consequentialist Argument
  • 7.5 Veritism and Credence-Based Views
  • 7.6 Conclusion
  • 8: The Normativity of Evidence
  • 8.1 Evidence and Probability
  • 8.2 The Nature of Probability Problem
  • The problem as it appears in the literature
  • A subjectivist solution?
  • 8.3 The Problem of Background Information
  • 8.4 The Degree of Likelihood Problem
  • 8.5 Conclusion
  • PART IV: FALLBACKS AND LOOSE ENDS
  • 9: Error Theory and Thought
  • 9.1 Normativism and Error Theory
  • 9.2 Against Conceptual Normativism
  • Preliminary response: Conceptual normativism and epistemic error theory
  • Main response: Against conceptual normativism
  • 9.3 Moore's Paradox and Conceptual Normativism
  • 9.4 An Error Theory of Belief?
  • 9.5 Normativity and Deliberation
  • 9.6 Conclusion
  • 10: A Puzzling Combination
  • 10.1 The Structure of the Argument
  • 10.2 Moral Debunking and Dispensability
  • 10.3 Epistemic Debunking and Dispensability
  • 10.4 A Possible Error Theorist
  • 10.5 Conclusion
  • 11: Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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