Instrumental Rationality

The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence
 
 
Oxford University Press
  • erschienen am 29. April 2020
  • |
  • 240 Seiten
 
E-Book | ePUB mit Adobe-DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-0-19-106395-4 (ISBN)
 
Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief.
  • Englisch
  • Oxford
  • |
  • Großbritannien
  • 0,37 MB
978-0-19-106395-4 (9780191063954)
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John Brunero is the Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, and was a Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. He has published in Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Ethics.
  • Cover
  • Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Table of Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1: Introduction
  • 1.1 The Roadmap
  • 1.2 Kant on Hypothetical Imperatives
  • 1.3 Contemporary Interest
  • 1.4 Formulating Means-Ends Coherence: The Instrumental Belief
  • 1.5 Conclusion
  • 2: Bootstrapping
  • 2.1 Clarifying the Question
  • 2.2 The Bootstrapping Objection
  • 2.2.1 What Is the Bootstrapping Objection?
  • 2.2.2 Bootstrapping as Incoherent Advice
  • 2.3 Rational Deliberation and Tie-Breaking Reasons
  • 2.3.1 Rational Deliberation and Underdetermination
  • 2.3.2 From Rationality to Reasons
  • 2.4 Promotion and Insufficient Means
  • 2.5 Conclusion
  • 3: Scope
  • 3.1 Rational Requirements
  • 3.2 The Case for Wide-Scoping
  • 3.2.1 The Argument
  • 3.2.2 Challenges to the Argument
  • 3.3 The Case for Narrow-Scoping
  • 3.3.1 The Means-Ends Asymmetry
  • 3.3.2 Escape and Compliance
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • 4: Normativity I
  • 4.1 Normative Disjunctivism
  • 4.2 Is Normative Disjunctivism True?
  • 4.2.1 "Ought" and Ability
  • 4.2.2 Advantageous Incoherence
  • 4.2.3 Practical and Theoretical Reason
  • 4.2.4 Mere Permissibility
  • 4.2.5 Normative Conjunctive Disjunctivism
  • 4.3 Does It Support the Myth Theory?
  • 4.4 Conclusion
  • 5: Normativity II
  • 5.1 Reasons to be Rational
  • 5.1.1 Evaluating the Prichard Analogy
  • 5.1.2 The Costs of Incoherence
  • 5.2 Against Strong Normativity
  • 5.2.1 Advantageous Incoherence
  • 5.2.2 Transmission to Necessary Means
  • 5.2.3 Transmission to Sufficient Means
  • 5.3 Subjective Oughts
  • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6: Belief
  • 6.1 Cognitivism with the Strong Belief Thesis
  • 6.1.1 The Case for the Strong Belief Thesis
  • 6.1.2 The Case against the Strong Belief Thesis
  • 6.2 Cognitivism without the Strong Belief Thesis
  • 6.2.1 Towards a Cognitivist Account without Strong Belief
  • 6.2.2 Unknown Failures to Intend
  • 6.3 Problems for Cognitivism's Explanatory Claim
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • 7: Intention
  • 7.1 The Aim of Intention
  • 7.1.1 The Aim of Belief
  • 7.1.2 Bratman's Account
  • 7.1.3 Controlled Action
  • 7.2 Non-Normative Disjunctivism
  • 7.2.1 Advantages
  • 7.2.2 Extension to Other Rational Requirements
  • 7.2.3 Explaining Pressure
  • 7.2.4 Social Practices, Normativity, and Myths
  • 7.3 Conclusion
  • 8: Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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