Why have the economies of some developing countries fallen back while others have advanced? Why have so many stabilization and structural adjustment programs failed to deliver growth dividends? This book shows that there is a common and valid answer: political credibility defined as the predictability of the institutional rules of the game. This case is not only argued theoretically but also found to be confirmed by empirical analysis. Ten case studies pitting Latin American countries against Southeast Asian ones reveal the sources of political credibility. Economic openness is the necessary precondition, long-term reputation or democratic participation the sufficient one. Despite the seemingly superior strength of authoritarian reputation democratic control is the more successful road.
Sprache
Verlagsort
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Dateigröße
ISBN-13
978-1-349-24049-4 (9781349240494)
DOI
10.1007/978-1-349-24049-4
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Introduction - PART 1: THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CREDIBILITY ON GROWTH: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE - Catching Up or Falling Behind? - Political Credibility: A Crucial Factor in the Growth Story - Measuring Political Credibility - Political Credibility and Economic Growth: the Empirical Evidence - PART 2: THE SOURCES OF POLITICAL CREDIBILITY - Explaining Political Credibility: Conceptual Foundations - Sources of Political Credibility in 10 Case Study Countries - Policy Conclusions: Traditional Approaches to Reform and Implications from the Credibility Perspective - References - Appendix I: The Neoclassical Solow-Model of Economic Growth - Appendix II: Private Sector Questionnaire - Appendix III: Indicator of Political Credibility - Appendix IV: Measurement and Indicators of Openness - Index
