Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets

Second Edition
 
 
Princeton University Press
  • erschienen am 8. September 2013
  • |
  • 464 Seiten
 
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
978-1-4008-4819-5 (ISBN)
 

Most labor economics textbooks pay little attention to actual labor markets, taking as reference a perfectly competitive market in which losing a job is not a big deal. The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets is the only textbook to focus on imperfect labor markets and to provide a systematic framework for analyzing how labor market institutions operate. This expanded, updated, and thoroughly revised second edition includes a new chapter on labor-market discrimination; quantitative examples; data and programming files enabling users to replicate key results of the literature; exercises at the end of each chapter; and expanded technical appendixes.



The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets examines the many institutions that affect the behavior of workers and employers in imperfect labor markets. These include minimum wages, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, working-time regulations, family policies, equal opportunity legislation, collective bargaining, early retirement programs, education and migration policies, payroll taxes, and employment-conditional incentives. Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are today being changed by political and economic forces.


    • Expanded, thoroughly revised second edition

    • New chapter on labor-market discrimination

    • New quantitative examples

    • New data sets enabling users to replicate key results of the literature

    • New end-of-chapter exercises (with solutions at www.press.princeton.edu)

    • Expanded technical appendixes

    • Unique focus on institutions in imperfect labor markets

    • Integrated framework and systematic coverage

    • Self-contained chapters on each of the most important labor-market institutions

    • Englisch
    • Princeton
    • |
    • USA
    • 8,11 MB
    978-1-4008-4819-5 (9781400848195)
    1400848199 (1400848199)
    weitere Ausgaben werden ermittelt
    Tito Boeri & Jan van Ours
    • Cover
    • Title
    • Copyright
    • Contents
    • Boxes and Available Datasets
    • Preface and Acknowledgments
    • Symbols and Acronyms
    • 1 Overview
    • 1.1 A Few Key Definitions
    • 1.2 The Reservation Wage and the Value of a Job
    • 1.2.1 From Individual to Aggregate Labor Supply
    • 1.2.2 The Value of a Job
    • 1.2.3 A Perfect Labor Market Equilibrium
    • 1.3 Labor Market Institutions
    • 1.3.1 Acting on Prices
    • 1.3.2 Acting on Quantities
    • 1.3.3 Institutional Interactions
    • 1.3.4 Why Do Labor Market Institutions Exist?
    • 1.4 Reforms of Labor Market Institutions
    • 1.5 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 1.6 Technical Annex: A Simple Static Framework
    • 1.6.1 A Competitive Labor Market
    • 1.6.2 Labor Market Institutions
    • 1.6.3 The Wedge
    • 1.6.4 Product Market Competition and the Employment Bias of Institutions
    • 2 Minimum Wages
    • 2.1 Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 2.2 Theory
    • 2.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 2.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 2.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 2.3.1 Studies Based on Firm-Level Data
    • 2.3.2 Studies Based on Natural Experiments
    • 2.3.3 Studies Based on Workers' Histories
    • 2.4 Policy Issues
    • 2.4.1 Should the Minimum Wage Be Reduced or Increased?
    • 2.4.2 Should There Be a Youth Minimum Wage?
    • 2.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 2.6 Why Does a Minimum Wage Exist?
    • 2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 2.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 2.9 Technical Annex: Minimum Wage Revisited
    • 2.9.1 Minimum Wage and Monopsony
    • 2.9.2 Bargaining or Government Setting?
    • 2.9.3 Efficiency Wages
    • 3 Unions and Collective Bargaining
    • 3.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 3.1.1 Union Density
    • 3.1.2 Coverage and Excess Coverage
    • 3.1.3 Centralization and Coordination
    • 3.1.4 Strike Activity
    • 3.2 Theory
    • 3.2.1 Collective Bargaining
    • 3.2.2 Union Membership
    • 3.2.3 Strikes
    • 3.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 3.3.1 Effects of Unions on Wages
    • 3.3.2 Bargaining Coordination, Union Density, and Unemployment
    • 3.4 Policy Issues
    • 3.4.1 Do Unions Increase Efficiency?
    • 3.4.2 Should Collective Bargaining Be Decentralized?
    • 3.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 3.6 Why Do Unions Exist?
    • 3.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 3.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 3.9 Technical Annex: Unions Revisited
    • 3.9.1 How Strong Should Unions Be to Be Efficient?
    • 3.9.2 Deriving the Contract Curve
    • 4 Antidiscrimination Legislation
    • 4.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 4.2 Theory
    • 4.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 4.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 4.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 4.3.1 Unconditional Gender Employment and Earnings Gaps
    • 4.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Discrimination in the Labor Market
    • 4.4 Policy Issues
    • 4.4.1 Equal Pay Legislation
    • 4.4.2 Affirmative Action
    • 4.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 4.6 Why Does Antidiscrimination Legislation Exist?
    • 4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 4.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 4.9 Technical Annex: Discrimination
    • 4.9.1 Prejudice in a Competitive Labor Market
    • 4.9.2 Monopsony and Gender Discrimination
    • 4.9.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity in a Correspondence Study
    • 5 Regulation of Working Hours
    • 5.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 5.2 Theory
    • 5.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 5.2.2 Labor Supply: Overtime Pay and Availability of Part-Time Work
    • 5.2.3 Labor Demand and the Choice between Hours and Workers
    • 5.2.4 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 5.2.5 Short-Time Work
    • 5.2.6 Regulating Weekly Working Hours
    • 5.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 5.3.1 Working Hours
    • 5.3.2 Part-Time Work
    • 5.4 Policy Issues
    • 5.4.1 Should Governments Regulate Working Hours?
    • 5.4.2 Should Governments Subsidize STW?
    • 5.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 5.6 Why Does Regulation of Working Hours Exist?
    • 5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 5.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 5.9 Technical Annex: Intensive and Extensive Margins
    • 6 Early Retirement Plans
    • 6.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 6.2 Theory
    • 6.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 6.3.1 Age and Employment
    • 6.3.2 Age and Productivity
    • 6.4 Policy Issues
    • 6.4.1 Should the Mandatory Retirement Age Be Increased?
    • 6.4.2 Should Early Retirement Programs Be Phased Out?
    • 6.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 6.6 Why Do Early Retirement Programs Exist?
    • 6.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 6.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 6.9 Technical Annex: Optimal Retirement Age
    • 7 Family Policies
    • 7.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 7.2 Theory
    • 7.2.1 Subsidized Childcare
    • 7.2.2 Mandated Parental Leave
    • 7.2.3 Effects on Fertility
    • 7.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 7.4 Policy Issues
    • 7.4.1 Should Public Policies Encourage Mothers to Work?
    • 7.4.2 Who in the Family Should Receive the Subsidy?
    • 7.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 7.6 Why Do Family Policies Exist?
    • 7.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 7.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 7.9 Technical Annex: Family Policies
    • 7.9.1 Childcare Facilities
    • 7.9.2 The Surplus from Home Production
    • 7.9.3 The Unitary and Collective Models of the Household
    • 8 Education and Training
    • 8.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 8.2 Theory
    • 8.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 8.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 8.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 8.3.1 Returns to Schooling
    • 8.3.2 Estimating the Returns to Schooling
    • 8.3.3 On-the-Job Training
    • 8.4 Policy Issues
    • 8.4.1 Should There Be a Compulsory Schooling Age?
    • 8.4.2 Should Governments Subsidize In-Company Training?
    • 8.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 8.6 Why Do Governments Subsidize Education and Training?
    • 8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 8.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 8.9 Technical Annex: Education and Training
    • 8.9.1 Optimal Years of Schooling
    • 8.9.2 Signaling
    • 8.9.3 Derivation of the Mincer Equation
    • 8.9.4 Who Pays for General Training?
    • 9 Migration Policies
    • 9.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 9.2 Theory
    • 9.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 9.2.2 An Economy with Wage Rigidities
    • 9.2.3 What Drives Migration Decisions?
    • 9.2.4 Effects on Income Distribution of Skill-Biased Migration
    • 9.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 9.3.1 Labor Market Effects of Immigration
    • 9.3.2 Fiscal Effects of Immigration
    • 9.3.3 Labor Market Performance of Migrants
    • 9.3.4 Labor Market Performance of Immigrant Children
    • 9.4 Policy Issues
    • 9.4.1 Closing the Welfare Door?
    • 9.4.2 Adopting a Points System?
    • 9.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 9.6 Why Do Migration Policies Exist?
    • 9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 9.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 9.9 Technical Annex: Net Gains from Migration
    • 10 Employment Protection Legislation
    • 10.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 10.2 Theory
    • 10.2.1 A Neutrality Result
    • 10.2.2 Removing Risk Neutrality
    • 10.2.3 EPL with Rigid Wages
    • 10.2.4 EPL as a Tax
    • 10.2.5 Two-Tier Regimes
    • 10.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 10.3.1 Cross-Country Analyses
    • 10.3.2 Studies Based on Firm and Worker Data
    • 10.3.3 Endogeneity of EPL
    • 10.4 Policy Issues
    • 10.4.1 How Much Protection Should EPL Provide?
    • 10.4.2 Should There Be a Single Employment Contract?
    • 10.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 10.6 Why Does EPL Exist?
    • 10.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 10.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 10.9 Technical Annex: When Is EPL Efficient?
    • 11 Unemployment Benefits
    • 11.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 11.2 Theory
    • 11.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 11.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 11.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 11.3.1 Effects of UBs on Unemployment Duration
    • 11.3.2 Effect of UBs on Post-unemployment Outcomes
    • 11.4 Policy Issues
    • 11.4.1 Should the Generosity of UBs Vary over the Business Cycle?
    • 11.4.2 Is Moral Hazard All That Matters?
    • 11.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 11.6 Why Do UBs Exist?
    • 11.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 11.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 11.9 Technical Annex: Search Theory and Duration Models
    • 11.9.1 Search Theory
    • 11.9.2 Duration Models
    • 12 Active Labor Market Policies
    • 12.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 12.2 Theory
    • 12.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 12.3.1 Experimental Studies
    • 12.3.2 Nonexperimental Studies
    • 12.4 Policy Issues
    • 12.4.1 Do We Need Public Employment Services?
    • 12.4.2 Do We Need Activation Policies?
    • 12.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 12.6 Why Do ALMPs Exist?
    • 12.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 12.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 12.9 Technical Annex: ALMP
    • 12.9.1 The Statistical Foundations of the Matching Function
    • 12.9.2 Activating Unemployed Workers
    • 13 Payroll Taxes
    • 13.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons
    • 13.2 Theory
    • 13.2.1 A Perfect Labor Market
    • 13.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market
    • 13.3 Empirical Evidence
    • 13.4 Policy Issues
    • 13.4.1 How to Make Work Pay?
    • 13.4.2 How to Pay and Target Beneficiaries
    • 13.5 Interactions with Other Institutions
    • 13.6 Why Do Payroll Taxes Exist?
    • 13.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
    • 13.8 Review Questions and Exercises
    • 13.9 Technical Annex: Payroll Taxes
    • 13.9.1 Taxes, Benefits, and the Structure of Taxation
    • 13.9.2 General Equilibrium Effects of Taxes
    • References
    • Name Index
    • Subject Index

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