This book, first published in 1987, is about the classic free will problem, construed in terms of the implications of moral responsibility. The principal thesis is that the core issue is metaphysical: can scientific laws postulate objectively necessary connections between an action and its causal antecedents? The author concludes they cannot, and that, therefore, free will and determinism can be reconciled.
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Für höhere Schule und Studium
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ISBN-13
978-1-351-78534-1 (9781351785341)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
1. Introduction 2. The Concept of Moral Responsibility 3. Causal and Moral Responsibility 4. Intention and Moral Responsibility 5. Addiction 6. Power 7. Contingent Responsibility 8. Laws As Necessary Truths 9. The Regularity Theory of Laws 10. Autonomy 11. Responsibility and Psychological Theory
