Handbook of Commercial Policy

 
 
North Holland (Verlag)
  • 1. Auflage
  • |
  • erschienen am 2. November 2016
  • |
  • 558 Seiten
 
E-Book | ePUB mit Adobe DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
E-Book | PDF mit Adobe DRM | Systemvoraussetzungen
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978-0-444-63376-7 (ISBN)
 

Handbook of Commercial Policy explores three main topics that permeate the study of commercial policy. The first section presents a broad set of basic empirical facts regarding the pattern and evolution of commercial policy, with the second section investigating the crosscutting legal issues relating to the purpose and design of agreements. Finally, the third section covers key issues of commercial policy in the modern global economy.

Every chapter in the book provides coverage from the perspectives of multilateral, and where appropriate, preferential trade agreements. While most other volumes are policy-oriented, this comprehensive guide explores the ways that intellectual thinking and rigor organize research, further making frontier-level synthesis and current theoretical and empirical research accessible to all.


  • Covers the research areas that are critical for understanding how the world of commercial policy has changed, especially over the last 20 years
  • Presents the way in which research on the topic have evolved
  • Scrutinizes the economic modeling of bargaining and legal issues
  • Useful for examining the theory and empirics of commercial policy
2214-3122
  • Englisch
  • Saint Louis
  • |
  • Niederlande
Elsevier Science
  • 15,30 MB
978-0-444-63376-7 (9780444633767)
0444633766 (0444633766)
weitere Ausgaben werden ermittelt
  • Front Cover
  • Handbook of Commercial Policy
  • Copyright
  • Introduction to the Series
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Contributors
  • Part I: Commercial Policy: Empirical Facts, Determinants and Effects
  • Chapter 1: The Empirical Landscape of Trade Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Import Tariffs
  • 2.1. MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under the WTO
  • 2.1.1. MFN Applied Rates, Tariff Bindings/Caps, and Binding Commitments
  • 2.1.2. MFN Applied Tariffs Across Sectors
  • 2.1.3. MFN Applied Tariffs Within Sectors by End-Use
  • 2.1.4. Changes to MFN Applied Tariffs Over Recent History
  • 2.2. MFN Specific Duties Under the WTO
  • 2.3. Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under Preferential Trading Arrangements
  • 2.3.1. Major Economies and Their Preferential Trading Arrangements
  • 2.3.2. Preferential Tariffs Across Countries
  • 2.3.3. Tariff Preferences Offered by the United States
  • 2.4. Other Import Tariffs Beyond MFN and Bilateral Tariff Preferences
  • 3. Border Policies Beyond Import Tariffs
  • 3.1. Temporary Trade Barriers of Antidumping, Countervailing Duties, and Safeguards
  • 3.2. Quantitative Restrictions, Import Quotas, and Tariff Rate Quotas
  • 3.3. Price Undertakings and Voluntary Export Restraints
  • 3.4. Import Licensing, Customs Valuation, and Trade Facilitation
  • 4. The Historical Evolution of Border Barriers Under the GATT
  • 4.1. Pre-GATT 1947 Tariff Levels and Tariff Trends Over the GATT Period
  • 4.2. Changing Tariff Rates Under the GATT
  • 4.3. GATT Exceptions and the Rise of Major Carve-Outs
  • 4.3.1. Emergency Import Restrictions to Address Balance of Payments Problems
  • 4.3.2. Japan's GATT Accession and the ``Temporary´´ Article XXXV Exception
  • 4.3.3. The Rise of Voluntary Export Restraints, Including the Multifiber Arrangement
  • 4.3.4. Agriculture
  • 4.3.5. Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries
  • 4.3.6. Antidumping in Historical Perspective
  • 4.4. Implications for the Contemporary Landscape of Trade Policy
  • 5. Behind-the-Border Policies
  • 5.1. Behind-the-Border Policies Affecting Supply
  • 5.1.1. Domestic Subsidies: Aircraft, Agriculture, Semiconductors, and Clean Energy
  • 5.1.2. Other Supply-Side Policies: Competition, Production Standards, Environment and Labor
  • 5.2. BTB Policies Affecting Demand
  • 5.2.1. Taxes, Foreign Investment Measures, and Local Content Requirements
  • 5.2.2. Other Demand Policies: Consumer Safety, Product Labeling, and IPRs
  • 5.3. Final Caveats on BTB Policies
  • 6. Conclusion
  • A. Data Appendix
  • A.1. Tariff Data
  • A.2. Temporary Trade Barriers (Antidumping, Safeguards, and Countervailing Duties) Data
  • A.3. Historical Data from the GATT Archives
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Commercial Policy
  • 1. Socially Optimal Policy: A Cursory Review
  • 1.1. Neoclassical Models
  • 1.2. Imperfect Competition
  • 1.3. Foreign Asset Issues
  • 1.4. Social Welfare Maximizing Policy Without Lump-Sum Transfers
  • 2. What We Know About the Demand for Protection
  • 2.1. Studies Based on Behavior of Politicians
  • 2.2. Studies Based on Elections
  • 2.3. Studies Based on Survey Data
  • 2.4. General Observations
  • 3. Political Conditions Shape Commercial Policy
  • 3.1. Electoral Competition: Theory
  • 3.2. Electoral Competition: Empirics
  • 3.3. Lobbying: Theory
  • 3.3.1. Informational Lobbying
  • 3.3.2. Influence Peddling
  • 3.3.3. General Observations
  • 3.4. Lobbying: Empirics
  • 3.4.1. The First Wave
  • 3.4.2. The Ederington-Minier Calamity and Other Critiques
  • 3.4.3. Other Contributions
  • 3.4.4. General Observations
  • 3.5. Legislative Bargaining
  • 4. Feedback Effects: Political Conditions Are Also Endogenous
  • 5. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 3: The Effects of Trade Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. Does Trade Policy Matter?
  • 1.2. Conceptual Issues and Focus of This Chapter
  • 2. Methodology
  • 2.1. Overview of Methodology
  • 2.2. Methodological Challenges
  • 2.2.1. Measurement of Trade Policy
  • 2.2.2. Aggregation and Heterogeneity
  • 2.2.3. Endogeneity of Trade Policy
  • 2.2.4. Anticipation of Trade Reform and Reduction in Uncertainty About Trading Environment
  • 3. The Effects of Trade Policy: Trade Volume, Prices, Extensive Margin, and Gains from Trade
  • 3.1. Effects on Trade Volume
  • 3.1.1. Evidence on Effects on Trade Volume
  • 3.1.2. Trade Growth vs Trade Elasticity and Gains from Trade
  • 3.1.3. Trade Elasticity and Trade Policy
  • 3.2. Effects on Prices
  • 3.3. Effects on the Extensive Margin
  • 3.4. Effects on Aggregate (Static) Gains from Trade
  • 4. The Effects of Trade Policy on Firms: Productivity, Costs, and Markups
  • 5. The Effects of Trade Policy on Labor Markets
  • 6. The Effects of Trade Policy on Aggregate Growth and Poverty
  • 7. The Effects of Trade Policy: Secondary Distortions, Misallocation, the Role of Policy Uncertainty, and Dynamics
  • 7.1. Effects of Secondary Distortions and Misallocation
  • 7.2. The Role of Trade Policy Uncertainty
  • 8. Concluding Thoughts
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 4: Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Methods
  • 2.1. Theory
  • 2.1.1. Setup
  • 2.1.2. Equilibrium in Levels
  • 2.1.3. Equilibrium in Changes
  • 2.1.4. First-Order Conditions
  • 2.2. Calibration
  • 2.2.1. Elasticity Estimation
  • 2.2.1.1. Feenstra (1994)
  • 2.2.1.2. Caliendo and Parro (2015)
  • 2.2.1.3. Discussion
  • 2.2.2. Trade Deficits
  • 2.2.3. Optimization
  • 2.2.3.1. Optimal Tariffs
  • 2.2.3.2. Nash Tariffs
  • 2.2.3.3. Cooperative Tariffs
  • 3. Application
  • 3.1. Data
  • 3.2. Welfare Effects
  • 3.3. Optimal Tariffs
  • 3.4. Trade Wars
  • 3.5. Trade Talks
  • 3.6. Discussion
  • 4. Extensions
  • 4.1. Alternative Models
  • 4.2. Other Trade Policy Applications
  • 4.3. Applications in Other Fields
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Part II: Trade Agreements: Legal Background, Purpose and Design
  • Chapter 5: Legal Aspects of Commercial Policy Rules
  • 1. The Hierarchy of Rules
  • 2. Border Instruments
  • 2.1. Tariffs
  • 2.1.1. GATT Article II and the Tariff Bindings
  • 2.1.2. National Tariff Schedules
  • 2.1.3. Plugging Loopholes in GATT Article II
  • 2.1.4. Renegotiation of Tariff Bindings
  • 2.1.5. Progressive Tariff Liberalization
  • 2.2. QRs
  • 3. MFN Obligations and Exceptions
  • 3.1. Article I(1)
  • 3.2. Quota MFN
  • 3.3. MFN Exceptions
  • 3.3.1. Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas (RTAs)
  • 3.3.1.1. GATT Rules
  • 3.3.1.2. Special Legal Features of RTAs
  • 3.3.2. Special and Differential Treatment
  • 4. Domestic Tax and Regulatory Policies: National Treatment
  • 4.1. Internal Taxes
  • 4.2. Internal Regulations
  • 4.3. Mixing Regulations/Local Content Requirements
  • 4.4. Exceptions: Government Procurement and Subsidies
  • 5. The General Exceptions to GATT: Articles XX and XXI
  • 6. The Technical Barriers Codes
  • 6.1. Coverage
  • 6.2. MFN, National Treatment, and Exceptions
  • 6.3. Scientific Evidence Requirements
  • 6.4. Harmonization and Reference to International Standards
  • 6.5. Mutual Recognition
  • 6.6. Consistency Requirements
  • 6.7. Notice, Comment, and Transparency Requirements
  • 7. Subsidies
  • 7.1. GATT Rules
  • 7.2. The SCMs Agreement
  • 7.2.1. ``Subsidy´´ and ``Specificity´´
  • 7.2.2. Prohibited Subsidies
  • 7.2.3. Actionable Subsidies
  • 7.2.4. Countervailing Duties
  • 8. Antidumping Measures
  • 8.1. Basic Principles
  • 8.2. Antidumping Law vs Antitrust Law
  • 8.3. The Puzzling Persistence of Antidumping Law
  • 9. Safeguard Measures
  • 9.1. Textual Prerequisites for Safeguard Measures
  • 9.2. Issues in Application and Developments in WTO Jurisprudence
  • 9.2.1. Increased Quantities
  • 9.2.2. Unforeseen Developments and Obligations Incurred
  • 9.2.3. Industry Definition
  • 9.2.4. Serious Injury
  • 9.2.5. Causation and Nonattribution
  • 9.3. Remedial Issues and the Balance of Concessions
  • 10. Miscellaneous Legal Issues
  • 10.1. Subsidiary Governments
  • 10.2. Accession and Accession Protocols
  • 10.3. Waiver, Amendment, and Plurilaterals
  • 10.4. The Relationship Among WTO Agreements
  • 11. Trade in Services (GATS)
  • 12. TRIPs
  • 13. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 6: Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Mind Over Matter
  • 1. The Argument
  • 2. The Uruguay Round and the Birth of the DSU
  • 2.1. Uruguay to Geneva: The Makings of the DSU
  • 2.1.1. Background of the Negotiation
  • 2.1.2. Section 301, and the Turn to Unilateralism
  • 2.2. Curbing Unilateralism
  • 2.2.1. Section301: Loved in DC, Hated Everywhere Else
  • 2.2.2. The Price to Stop Section 301
  • 2.3. Remedies in Case of Noncompliance
  • 2.3.1. Transatlantic Harmony
  • 2.3.2. Latins Like Retro
  • 2.3.3. Some Preferred Persuasion
  • 2.3.4. The Compromise
  • 3. Dispute Adjudication in WTO
  • 3.1. The Process
  • 3.1.1. An ``Exclusive´´ Forum for WTO Members Only
  • 3.2. Consultations
  • 3.2.1. Diplomacy First
  • 3.2.2. Bilateral, and yet so Multilateral
  • 3.2.3. Diplomacy Matters
  • 3.3. Litigation Before a Panel
  • 3.3.1. Mandate
  • 3.3.2. Process
  • 3.3.3. Outcome
  • 3.4. Litigation Before the AB
  • 3.4.1. The Mandate
  • 3.4.2. The Process
  • 3.4.3. Outcome
  • 3.5. Enforcement of Decisions
  • 3.5.1. Compliance Process
  • 3.5.2. The Last Resort
  • 3.5.3. It is a Long Way to Tipperary (or Is It?)
  • 4. Practice
  • 4.1. Process
  • 4.2. Calculating the Amount of Countermeasures
  • 4.3. Property, or Liability Rules?
  • 4.4. Recap
  • 5. Mind Over Matter
  • 5.1. Prospective Remedies, Specific-, and Diffuse Reciprocity
  • 5.2. Specific-, Diffuse Reciprocity, and Compliance with the WTO
  • 5.3. No Forum Diversion
  • 5.4. Constraining Punishment
  • 6. Section 301: A Foe and a Friend of Multilateralism
  • Annexes
  • Annex I. Duration of Process
  • Annex II. Recourse to Article 22 of the DSU (Jan. 1, 1995-Jan. 2, 2016)
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 7: The Purpose of Trade Agreements
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. International Externalities from Unilateral Trade Policies
  • 2.1. Welfare-Maximizing Policy Makers
  • 2.2. Why a Formal Agreement?
  • 2.3. Trade Agreements among Politically Minded Governments
  • 2.4. Is it All About the Terms of Trade?
  • 2.5. Market Distortions and Corrective Policies
  • 2.6. Critiques of the Theory
  • 3. International Externalities With Imperfect Competition
  • 3.1. Firm-Delocation Externalities
  • 3.2. Profit-Extracting and Profit-Shifting Externalities
  • 3.3. Profit-Extracting Externalities in International Outsourcing Relationships
  • 3.4. International Agreements to Protect Intellectual Property
  • 4. Trade Agreements as Commitment Devices
  • 5. Incentives to Form Regional or Preferential Trade Agreements
  • 5.1. The Ohyama-Kemp-Wan Theorem
  • 5.2. Terms-of-Trade Gains
  • 5.3. Political Incentives for Regional or Preferential Agreements
  • 5.4. PTAs as Stepping Stones to Multilateral Free Trade
  • 6. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 8: The Design of Trade Agreements
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Diagnosis of the Problem
  • 2.1. Competitive General-Equilibrium Model of Trade Agreements
  • 2.1.1. The Model
  • 2.1.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 2.2. Competitive Partial-Equilibrium Model of Trade Agreements
  • 2.2.1. Partial-Equilibrium Model
  • 2.2.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 2.2.3. Missing Instruments in the Partial-Equilibrium Model
  • 2.3. Monopolistic Competition Model of Trade Agreements
  • 2.3.1. Monopolistic Competition Model
  • 2.3.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 2.4. Offshoring Model of Trade Agreements
  • 2.4.1. Offshoring Model
  • 2.4.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 2.5. Summary
  • 2.6. GATT's Designers and the Terms-of-Trade Externality
  • 3. Reciprocity
  • 3.1. Reciprocal Liberalization
  • 3.1.1. The GATT Principle of Reciprocity
  • 3.1.2. The Applications of Reciprocity in the GATT/WTO
  • 3.1.3. The Political Optimum as a Focal Outcome of GATT/WTO Negotiations
  • 3.1.4. Reciprocity and the GATT/WTO Bargaining Process
  • 3.2. Reciprocity and the Terms-of-Trade Theory Under Alternative Assumptions
  • 3.3. Reciprocity Beyond the Terms-of-Trade Theory
  • 4. Nondiscrimination
  • 4.1. A Three-Country Model, Discriminatory Tariffs, and MFN
  • 4.1.1. Discriminatory Tariffs
  • 4.1.2. MFN
  • 4.2. MFN Plus Reciprocity
  • 4.2.1. The Bilateral Opportunism Problem and the Free-Rider Problem
  • 4.2.2. MFN Plus Reciprocity
  • 4.3. Multilateral Reciprocity
  • 5. Bindings and Overhang
  • 6. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Index
  • Back Cover

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