During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Suitable for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a critique of the army's capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies.
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Chad C. Serena works at the RAND Corporation, where he analyzes national security issues with a focus on US Army strategy and doctrine. He received his PhD from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served in the US Army as a military intelligence officer, a signals intelligence officer, and in various information operations positions in the Second Stryker brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington.
Preface Introduction 1. Decisions in the Post-Cold War Period 2. The Transformation of the US Army 3. The Invasion of Iraq and Compelled Adaptation 4. US Army Adaptation -- Organizational Inputs 5. US Army Adaptation -- Organizational Outputs and Learning 6. The US Army and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment in Perspective 7. Moving Forward Bibliography About the Author Index
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