Why do authoritarian regimes survive? How do dictators fail? What role do political institutions play in these two processes? Many of the answers to these questions can be traced to the same source: the interaction between institutions and preferences. Using Egypt as a case study, Professor Mahmoud Hamad describes how the synergy between judges and generals created the environment for the present government and a delicate balance for its survival. The history of modern Egypt is one of the struggle between authoritarian governments, and forces that advocate for more democratic rights. While the military has provided dictatorial leaders, the judiciary provides judges who have the power to either support or stymie authoritarian power. Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt provides a historically grounded explanation for the rise and demise of authoritarianism, and is one of the first studies of Egypt's judicial institutions within a single analytical framework.
Rezensionen / Stimmen
'Mahmoud Hamad's Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt constitutes a well-told and well-argued story of how political institutions, especially courts whose independence should define their function, can be manipulated and coopted by autocratic forces. This insightful analysis provides a road map for comprehending the power of courts to legitimize authoritarian regimes and the limits of judicial empowerment.' Mary L. Volcansek, Executive Director, Center for Texas Studies at Texas Christian University 'The book is a fascinating account of the role of the judiciary in modern Egyptian politics. As well as being of interest to those wanting to understand more about the particular history of the judiciary in Egypt, Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt provides more generalizable insights into the ways in which a degree of judicial independence can lend credibility to non-democratic governments. In particular it persuasively argues that the judiciary can be useful for an autocratic regime in providing an institutional foundation as a base for its longer-term survival. This book is an important point of reference for anyone interested in the relationship between judges and politicians in the context of non-democratic regimes.' Kate Malleson, Queen Mary, University of London
Sprache
Verlagsort
Zielgruppe
Editions-Typ
Produkt-Hinweis
Illustrationen
Worked examples or Exercises; 5 Tables, black and white; 8 Line drawings, black and white
Maße
Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
Dicke: 18 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-1-108-44244-2 (9781108442442)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Mahmoud Hamad is an assistant professor of political science at Cairo University and the founding secretary general of the Arab Association of Constitutional Law (2016-18). He previously taught at the University of Utah, Drake University, Iowa, and Brigham Young University, Utah. During his graduate studies, he won two Fulbright awards at the University of Washington and the University of Utah.
1. Introduction; 2. The historical legacies and the institutional culture of the Egyptian judiciary; 3. Nasser's Egypt: charisma, populism, and the attacks on judicial independence; 4. The years of Sadat: crisis, regime survival, and the awakening of judicial activism; 5. Judicial politics under Mubarak: judges and the fall of the Pharaoh; 6. The scaf, the courts, and Islamists: judges and the political transition; 7. Mursi and the judiciary: the self-fulfilling prophecy; 8. Patricians and plebeians: the chief justice paves the road to the general; 9. Old wine in a new bottle: Ssisi, judges, and the restoration of the ancien regime; References; Index.
