A Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

Central Themes from Locke to Wittgenstein
 
 
Routledge (Verlag)
  • 1. Auflage
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  • erschienen am 18. Februar 2019
 
  • Buch
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  • Softcover
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  • 306 Seiten
978-1-138-33972-9 (ISBN)
 
A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is a historically oriented introduction to the central themes in philosophy of language. Its narrative arc covers Locke's 'idea' theory, Mill's empiricist account of math and logic, Frege and Russell's development of modern logic and its subsequent deployment in their pioneering program of 'logical analysis', Ayer and Carnap's logical positivism, Quine's critique of logical positivism and elaboration of a naturalist-behaviorist approach to meaning, and later-Wittgenstein's 'ordinary language philosophy'-inspired rejection of the project of logical analysis. Thus, it historically situates the two central programs in early twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy -- logical analysis and logical positivism -- and discusses the central critiques they face later in the century in the works of Quine and the later-Wittgenstein. Unlike other secondary studies in philosophy of language, A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is not just a 'greatest hits album', i.e., a discontinuous compilation in which classics in the field are presented together with their standard criticisms one after the other. Instead, Fennell develops a particular, historical-thematic narrative in which the figures and ideas he treats are introduced in highly intentional ways. And by cross-referencing them throughout his discussions, he highlights the contributions they make to the narrative they comprise.
  • Englisch
  • London
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  • Großbritannien
Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Für höhere Schule und Studium
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  • Höhe: 229 mm
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  • Breite: 152 mm
  • 408 gr
978-1-138-33972-9 (9781138339729)

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John Fennell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Grinnell College in Grinnell, Iowa.
Introduction: Logico-Semantics, Logical Positivism and their Discontents








Chapter One: The Classical Empiricist Account of Meaning





1.1: The Inessentiality of language


1.2: The "'Idea' Idea"


1.3: The Primacy of the Naming Relation


1.4: The Linguistic Turn, Anti-Psychologism, and the Primacy of the Sentence


1.5: Logical Analysis





Chapter Two: Classical Empiricism and the Problem of the A Priori: Mill, Kant, and Frege





2.1: Some Background Distinctions: A Priori/A Posteriori, Analytic/Synthetic, Necessary/Contingent


2.2: Mill


2.3: Kant


2.4: Frege


2.5: Appendix: Russell's Set-Theoretic Paradox





Chapter Three: Frege's Begriffsschrift





3.1: Logic and its Limitations


3.2: Function and Argument


3.3: Predicates, Quantifiers and the Solution to the Problem of Multiple Generality


3.4: Sentence Connectives and the Solution to the Problem of a Unified Logical Notation


3.5: Identity


3.6: Appendix: Concordance between Begriffsschrift Notation and the Kalish/Montague/Mar Notation





Chapter Four: Frege on Sense and Reference





4.1: Three Semantic Puzzles for a Reference-Only (Extensionalist) Account of Meaning


4.2: The Sense/Reference Distinction


4.3: The Problems of Non-Referring Singular Terms and Identity Statements


4.4: The Problem of Belief Contexts


4.5: Problems with Frege's Solution


4.6: Definite Descriptions and Some Further Consequences of Frege's Sense/Reference Distinction





Chapter Five: Russell's Theory of Descriptions





5.1: Scope and Basic Strategy of the Theory of Descriptions


5.2: The Theory Applied to Definite Descriptions, including Non-Referring Definite Descriptions


5.3: Four Key Features of Russell's Analysis of Definite Descriptions


5.4: Russell's Solutions to Some Semantic Puzzles


5.5: Russell's Theory and Excluded Middle


5.6: Critical Discussion (I): Strawson


5.7: Critical Discussion (II): Donnellan





Chapter Six: Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference





6.1: Core Features of Russell's Theory


6.2: Three Key Problems for Russell's Description Theory


6.3: The Cluster Theory and its Analogous Problems


6.4: Correct Descriptions are neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Names to Refer


6.5: The Causal Theory of Reference-Grounding and Reference-Borrowing


6.6: The Causal Theory's Solution to the Three Problems


6.7: Rigid Designation and Necessary A Posteriori Propositions


6.8: The Distinction between Fixing the Reference and Giving the Meaning


6.9: The Contingency of 'Hesperus is the evening star' v. The Necessity of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'


6.10: Problems for Kripke's View





Chapter Seven: Logical Positivism I: Ayer





7.1: Three Central Doctrines of Logical Positivism


7.2: Realist v. Anti-Realist Accounts of Meaning


7.3: Versions of the Verification Principle


7.4: The Problem of the A Priori (again)


7.5: Questions regarding Conventionalism about Necessity and Logic





Chapter Eight: Logical Positivism II: Carnap





8.1: Conventionalism


8.2: Linguistic Frameworks


8.3: Internal v. External Questions and Formal v. Material Mode


8.4: Metaphysics and Tolerance


8.5: The Status of Philosophy








Chapter Nine: Quine's Critique of Positivism I: 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'





9.1: 'No Entity without Identity'


9.2: Two Different Conceptions of Synonymy: Definition and Substitution


9.3: Epistemic Holism and the Rejection of Meaning and Synonymy


9.4: Epistemic Holism and the Elimination of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction


9.5: Epistemic Holism and the Web of Belief


9.6: Epistemic Holism, Fallibilism and the History of Science





Chapter Ten: Quine's Critique of Positivism II: Anti-Conventionalism





10.1: Quine's Problems with Conventionalism


10.2: Quine's Pragmatic Account of Logic and Necessity


10.3: Problems with Quine's Pragmatization of Logic: Dummett and Davidson





Chapter Eleven: Quine: Radical Translation and the Indeterminacy of Meaning





11.1: Occasion Sentences, Standing Sentences, Stimulus Meaning, and Stimulus Synonymy


11.2: The Argument for Indeterminacy: Holism and Behaviorism


11.3: First-Personal and Ontological Indeterminacy v. Third-Personal and Epistemological Under-Determination


11.4: The Principle of Charity: Pragmatic or Constitutive


11.5: Some Problems with Charity and Logic.





Chapter Twelve: Later-Wittgenstein I: Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Critique of Ostension





12.1: Ordinary Language Philosophy, Grammatical Investigations and Language Games


12.2: The Critique of the Augustinian Picture: The Language Games of the Grocer and the Builders


12.3: Wittgenstein's Critique of Ostensive Definition





Chapter Thirteen: Later-Wittgenstein II: The Rule-Following Considerations





13.1: The Problem of Meaning Scepticism


13.2: Algorithms and Dispositions


13.3: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Community Dispositionalism and the 'Sceptical Solution'


13.4: Textual Evidence For and Against Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein


13.5: Normatively-Rich Practices: Sociality


13.6: Normatively-Rich Practices: Contextualism and Fallibilism





Chapter Fourteen: Later-Wittgenstein III: The Private Language Argument





14.1: The Relation between the Rule-Following Discussion and the Private Language Argument


14.2: The 'Independent Check' Argument


14.3: The Independent Check Argument Evaluated: Ayer's Objection and Kripke's Footnote 47


14.4: The Grammatical Status of Two Statements of Privacy


14.5: The Expressive (Not Descriptive) Grammar of Sensation Talk


14.6: Wittgenstein and Behaviorism





""Fennell's Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Language is a fine supplementary text for an undergraduate introduction to the field."


--Russell Marcus in Teaching Philosophy








"John Fennell weaves crystal clear, careful expositions, and exciting discussions of key figures in the analytic philosophy of language and logic into a sweeping historical narrative, bringing these figures into lively conversation with each other and placing their ideas and concerns into the context of larger developments in modern theoretical philosophy. Highly recommended both as a companion for the student and a refresher and resource for the seasoned practitioner."


--Ronald Loeffler, Grand Valley State University

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